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Any sort of popular action through representatives stands upon decisions as to
(i) the constituency (further, if the selection is by ballot, the voters); and (2) the
selection of representatives (by balloting or by some other method of indicating
choice). These fundamental decisions' concerning employee representation under
the National Labor Relations Act are left within wide limits to the discretion of the
National Labor Relations Board. 2 Indiscreet treatment of these vital and often
t- A.B. 1914, A.M. x915, LL.B., 192o, S.J.D., 19x, Harvard University. Professor of Law, University
of Wisconsin Law School. Assistant General Counsel, National Labor Board, 1934; General Counsel, (first)
National Labor Relations Board, 1934: United States Labor Commissioner and Member of Governing
Body, International Labor Organization, 1935-1936.
* Citations herein of labor relations board (national and state) decisions are far from exhaustive. If
the writer has missed any significant cases, he begs the reader's indulgence in view of the ever increasing
frequency of the decisions of the several boards. Roughly twice as many representation determinations
were made by the NLRB in the six months August 1937-January 1938 as in the preceding two years.
Representation cases are now far outnumbering unfair labor practice cases. "Before validation of the
NLRA by the Supreme Court on April 12, 1937, the Board had conducted 88 elections . .. per month.
In the ten months succeeding April I2, 912 elections have been held, an average of 91 per month." NLRB
Release R-669 (March 1, 1938).
'And others answering: Who may ask for the setting in operation of the procedure itself? What
sort of controversy calls for a determination by the Board? What obstacles, such as an existing contract
or a recent selection of representatives, may stay the Board's making of decisions?
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. (5937 Supp.) §§.x5x-166 (herein-
after cited as the "NLRA"), provides:
§9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority
of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
(b) The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the full benefit of
their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the policies of this
Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof.
(c) Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning the representation of employees, the
Board may investigate such controversy and certify to the parties, in writing, the name or names of the
representatives that have been designated or selected. In any such investigation, the Board shall provide
for an appropriate hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under section zo or
otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such
representatives.
(d) Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section io (c) is based in whole or in part
upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c)-of this section, and there is a
petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation
shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under subsections zo (e) or
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intricate problems would destroy at its base the structure planned for the furtherance
of collective bargaining.
We well know from experience of government that in making these decisions
popular will is often perverted.. Gerrymandering is our term for one sort of unfair
decision regarding the constituency. Stuffing the ballot box is one sort of perversion
of the procedure of choice. The employees' representative for negotiating with the
employer must be fairly chosen; else the representative will not be respected by the
employer or the workers.
Personal duels, party riots, and military wars have been fought over boundaries,
systems of government, and choices of rulers times out of mind, because there was
no accepted way or no fairly administered procedure for settling these urgent differ-
ences of interest. But in the labor relations system that we are evolving in the
United States the determination of workers' representation has tended to prevent
such outbreaks. For thanks to the combination of flexibility and consistency that
characterizes the determinations of the National Labor Relations Board, and the
combination of fairness and firmness that marks its administration of elections, par-
tiality and corruption do not enter in to block the democratic process.
These questions of industrial government are settled quasi-judicially; that is,
after disinterested persons have heard and weighed all the evidence, they determine
who is the desired representative or fix the procedure suitable to get the evidence
necessary for their decision. When the evidence is obtained, they certify the repre-
sentative, whenever any is chosen within the terms of the statute. The election
machinery is entirely in the hands of non-contestants and non-partisans whose only
desire is to have it work fairly and efficiently to record the wishes of the employees.
This is a perfection of cadre never yet attained in popular government; it assures
avoidance of the cruder forms of maladministration of elections.
But neutrality alone is not enough. Elections iequire of the election commission
something more than honesty. Only a wise solution of the problems they present
can establish a satisfactory representation of the employees' interests.3
i. How FAR Is REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE NLRB's EXCLUSIvE AUTHORITY?
Jurisdiction over these problems must be centralized. If they were left to the
courts, there would undoubtedly emerge at first so great a disparity of decision as to
io (f), and thereupon the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth
in such transcript.
The equivalent legislation covering railroad workers is §2 (9) of the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577
(19a6), as amended, 48 STAT. 1I86 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. (1937 Supp.) §r52.
'Similar problems arise on the investors' side, particularly in corporations: classification of stock-
holders; voting rights; procedure of elections; etc., generally settled in detail in advance by articles of
incorporation. Owing to personal vicissitudes of employees, outside pressures causing expansion or con-
traction of the business, and changes of policy of management, participation of employees can be successful
only if the pattern can be varied to fit the various and ever changing situations of different enterprises.
Whereas fixity of property interest is basic for investors, flexibility of the sort found in the NLRB's applica-
tion.of NRLA §9 is just as indispensable for employees' collective participation in the government of any
enterprise.
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produce much discontent and criticism of the courts; and later, perhaps, a reaction,
marked by so little imagination and so blind an adherence to past decisions without
regard to differences in industrial conditions that the whole system would in the
end collapse. As it is, these special problems are made the province of expert bodies
whose decisions are reviewed by the courts with great respect 4-a province which
the courts in the first instance scrupulously avoid
Representation determinations of the NLRB are reviewableG in connection with
the fifth unfair labor practice. In United Employees' Ass'n v. NLRB7 it has recently
been held that they are not reviewable otherwise. This is the opinion of the Board
itself:
"Since no order against an employer is issued in such a proceeding [under section 9(c)],
there is no right of review of such certification [or refusal to certify?] in any court. If,
however, such certification of a labor organization is subsequently used ... to prove...
[the unfair labor practice of] refusing to bargain collectively with the labor organization
so certified, and a cease and desist order is issued . . . , the investigation and certification
under section 9(c) become reviewable ... as part of the record in the case."8
"In the longer history of the Railway Labor Act, representation decisions of the National Mediation
Board have been rarely upset. Th6 Supreme Court has approved its certification of the union receiving the
majority of votes cast in an election, though less than a majority of those qualified to vote. Virginian Ry. v.
System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 56o (1937): "Those who do not participate are presumed to
assent to the expressed will of the majority of those voting." This is th; present rule of the NLRB; The
Associated Press, x N.L.R.B. 686, 697 (193.6); R. C. A. Mfg. Co., 2 id. 159, 173 0936). Probably the
earlier practice of both boards of requiring a majority of those eligible to vote, would likewise have been
acceptable. Compare treatment of furloughed employees. Three Years of the Railway Labor Act (937)
5 I. J. A. MoNTULY BULL. 143, 146. The decision of the district court in Virginian Ry. Co. v. System
Fed. No. 40, 1' F. Supp. 621 (E. Va., 1935) (car men) that, for a choice, a majority of the qualified
voters must have voted, was not appealed. It has not been followed by the NLRB. R. C. A. Mfg. Co., supra.
There are some lother unappealed district court cases overruling the NMB in representation determina-
tions. Three Years of the Railway Labor Act, supra. But it appears to have been overruled only twice
by appellate courts, and never by the Supreme Court. In Brotherhood v. NMB, 88 F. (2d) 757 (App.
D. C., 1936), the court, while disclaiming any desire to curtail the Board's "large discretionary powers in
the conduct of elections" (p. 761), rejected* its determination for failu'e to hold an adequate hearing. In
Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry., 94 F. (2d) 97 (6th, 1937), there
being no finding by the Board, the facts found by the court showed that the Board's certificate should be
disregarded. On the other hand, great leeway is expressly accorded to the NMB in Ass'n of Clerical
Employees v. Brotherhood, 85 F. (2d) 152, 157 (7th, 1936) (courts will interfere in Board's determination
of unit only if there is "fraud or other gross impropriety"); Brotherhood v. Kenan, 87 F. (ad) 651 (5th,
1937); Nashville, C., & St. L. Ry. v. Railway Employees Dept., A.F.L., 93 F. (2d) 340 (6th, 1937). One
may expect a like treatment of the NLRB, which, unlike the NMB, does not act without a hearing except
by stipulation of all interested parties.
'Cole v. Atlanta Terminal Co., 15 F. Supp. 131 (N. Ga., X936); Lund v. Woodenware Workers
Union, 19 F. Supp. 607, 61o (Minn., 1937). The NLRB insists on its exclusive right. National Electric
Products Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (937). Contra: MeNulty v. NMB, 18 F. Supp. 484 (N. N. Y., 1936)
(action dismissed but problem not recognized as exclusively for the Board); Grace Co. v. Williams, 2o
F. Supp. 263, 266, and Cupples Co. v. AFL, id. 894, 897 (both E. Mo., 1937). Compare Oberman and
Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 id. 20, 26 (W. Mo., 1937). Comment (1938) 36 MICH. L. Rtv.
844. Since the courts may not prevent the NLRB from holding §io hearings, Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 58 Sup. Ct. 459 (1938), Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. Schaufiler, id. 466 (1938),
they surely may not prevent §9 hearings, whichi eventuate in no order. Heller Bros. Co. v. Lind, 86 F.
(2d) 862 (D. C., 1936); United Employees' Ass'n v. NLRB, C. C. A. 3d, March 18, 1938, 2 LABOR REL.
REP.. 132 (938).
e NLRA §9 (c). 7 Supra note 5.
'NLRB, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (937) 105. In Wisconsin, with the same statutory provisions, the
State Board's refusal to hold an election was sustained, the court saying: "This court has no authority
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If this interpretation of the Act is correct, there seems to be need of an amend-
ment permitting the Board's final action on representation petitions to be reviewed,
but only upon demand of employees. (Review at the instance of employers seems
superfluous at any time.) Court consideration of the Board's decision at this stage
would have three advantages. (i) It would avoid the needless involvement of the
employer in a (labor practice) proceeding which basically concerns a controversy
between employees. (2) It would enable the candidate which the Board has not
certified as exclusive representative, to obtain redress if the Board has abused its
authority; whereas if the only review is via Section 8(5), the position of such a
union is hopeless (a) because the Board has no duty, but only power, under Section
io(b), to issue complaints; (b) because a proper election is often the only possible
means of obtaining the evidence that the union is the choice of the employees which
is necessary to prove conduct within Section 8(5); and (c) because the right of an
uncertified claimant is not clearly reviewable even in an unfair labor practice pro-
ceeding.' (3) For the protection of the certified union and of the employer, the
certificate of the Board ought to be conclusive until revoked by the Board; for attack
in a collateral proceeding direct attack should be substituted.
Though the National Labor Relations Act gives the Board but slight guidance in
performing this function, the Board is not altogether a pioneer. Under the Railway
Labor Act,10 as amended in 1934, the National Mediation Board was making repre-
sentation determinations, often based on elections. And this technique had been
widely used also under the National Industrial Recovery Act. 1 In applying its Sec-
tion 7(a), the Petroleum Labor Policy Board, the National Steel Labor Relations
under the statutes to order an election (nor to stop one, so far as we can see). This discretion is committed
to the Labor Board, subject to the restraint-if any-that there must be some evidence to sustain its
determination that the majority representation is or is not in substantial dispute. Finding that evidence,
the Board's action or non-action thereon is conclusive." United Shoe Workers v. Wisconsin LRB (Free-
man Shoe Corp.), Dane County Circuit Court, Dec. 24, 1937. Review by the employer is of course
denied. Ex parte Wallach's, Inc., N. Y. Ct. App., March A8, 1938, 2 LABoR REL. REP. 135 (1938).
Under the Wisconsin LRB Rules, art. III, §3, the employer is not automatically a party.
'NLRB v. Pac. Greyhound Lines, 91 F. (2d) 458, 460 (9th, 1937) (dictum, not an unfair labor
practice to refuse to bargain with uncertified agency); Pfister Hotel (Wis. LRB, Aug. 30, 1937) (in case
of real doubt it is not unfair for employer to refuse to deal with uncertified union). But compare Globe
Mail Service, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 61o, 62o (1937) (by reason of the fact, though apparently then unknown to
employer, that on Sept. 29 union was choice of majority, "the respondent had a duty to bargain col-
lectively with the representatives of the union when they called on Sept. 29"); and The Triplett Electrical
Instrument Co., 5 id. No. 112, p. 21 (1938) (after careful investigation Board found that unit comprised
246 persons and held that from the day the union membership reached 124 the employer's refusal to
bargain was an unfair practice).
" Supra note 2.
1148 STAr. 195 (1933). The President's direction for the conduct of elections by the National Labor
Board, Executive Order 6580, Feb. 1, 1934, is the first official recognition of the procedure of election,
though even before then elections had been held by the NLR and other agencies charged with the enforce-
ment of NIRA §7(a).
Public Resolution 44, June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1183, under which the President set up the first
National Labor Relations Board, gave to boards he might create the power to subpoena payrolls, without
which elections in large plants are not feasible. The election procedure of this first NLRB is detailed in
Functions of the NLRB and the Regional Labor Boards, §§X, XI, issued Oct. 3r, 1934, and Instructions
of March 19, 1935. On elections conducted by this and the several agencies enforcing NIRA §7(a), see
LORWIN AND WVUBNIG, LABOR RELATIoNs BoARDS (1935).
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Board, the National Labor Board, and, above all, its successor, the first National
Labor Relations Board (1934-35) made well considered decisions concerning em-
ployee representation and developed methods for ihe determination of choice of
bargaining agents, with or without balloting, as the case might require. When the
Schechter case'12 destroyed the codes of fair competition which were the base on
which these labor boards stood, they soon disappeared. Congress, however, filled
the breach by promptly enacting the National Labor Relations Act, which under'
various forms and names had had its consideration for over a year.18 Five states
have followed suit by creating labor relations boards with like powers.' 4
2. THiE RELATION OF NLRB To STATE BOARDS
If there is overlapping jurisdiction of national and state labor relations acts,1 it
is nowhere more likely to cause difficulties than in the determination of repre-
sentatives, not so much because the national and state acts differ,16 as .because the
state and national boards may, in the exercise of their separate discretions, come to
different conclusions-particularly about appropriate bargaining units; about the
means of obtaining trustworthy evidence of the employees' choice; about the duration
of the choice. Determinations by a state board in cases within the competence of the
NLRB (assuming such determinations are constitutionally admissible) are worth
making only if the state board has some assurance in fact that the NLRB will respect
them. Without this a~surance, state boards could not make such determinations
without exposing their work to risk of complete discrediting by the NLRB. Actually
such a working arrangement has been made betweei the NLRB and Wisconsin
LRB, the only state board that is substantially operating in a field to which NLRB
competence extends.' 7
22Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
"See Lo wIN AND WUBNIG, op. zit. supra note ii, particularly c. 9.
"The five state labor relations acts are almost identical with NLRA in their provisions relating to
representation. These statutes (with date of enactment) are: Utah Laws 1937, C. 55 (March 22); Wis.
Laws 1937, c. 51 (April 15); N. Y. Laws 1937, C. 443 (May 2o, effective July i); Mass. Laws 1937, C.
436 (May 29); Penn. Acts 1937, No. 294 (June i).
"This possibility is greatest in Wisconsin. The State Labor Relations Acts (1938) 5! HARv. L. REv.
722, 729; 1938 Wis. L. REv. 160; Note (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 732; Wis. LRB v. Fred Rueping Leather
Co., now under advisement of the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
10Some differences are these: (i) The Wisconsin Act, §z55.o9(3), contains the clause "but no com-
pany union or officer thereof shall appear upon'any ballot taken by the board" (or presumably, be
certified as representative). The NLRB would exclude such a union probably only after a hearing and
finding that the employer had dominated, interfered with, or supported the union (see notes 127 and 128,
infra), whereas this formality might not be required by the Wis. LRB. Rice, The Wisconsin Labor Relations
Act in 1937, 1938 Wis. L. REv. 229, 252. (2) The New York Act, §705.2, requires the recognition of a
craft unit whenever the majority of the craftsmen so desires. This seems not to differ, however, from the
existing practice of the NLRB. (3) The New York Act, §705.5, provides for run-off elections between the
two leaders when there are three or more nominees and none gets a majority vote. Thus it impliedly
calls for a ballot not offering an opportunity to vote against all candidates (i.e., against collective bar-
gaining); whereas the NLRB since August, 1937 offers employees this option (see p. ooo, infra). (4) The
definition of employees (voters) varies slightly in different acts. See note 15o, infra. Other differences
are noted in The State Labor Relations Acts, supra note 15, esp. note 19.
"Rice, supra note 16, at 276. Since the NLRB, under §9(c), has no duty to determine representation
questions, it seems proper for it to leave them to settlement by a competent state agency. Even under
state acts that deny jurisdiction to the state agency where the NLRB may act, the state agencies are handling
cases which, it would seem, may be within the NLRB's competence.
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3. FORMAL RULES
Before hearing any controversies the Board adopted, in September, 1935, rules
relating to its work, which give further definition to the terms of the Act. These
rules 18 relate largely to formal proceedings and to the part played therein by the
Board's regional offices (of which there are twenty-two) and its field examiners.
They make the employer a party to representation cases, as well as those who claim
to represent employees. In this sort of proceeding, unlike the unfair labor practice
proceeding, the Board itself is not a party. It serves no complaint; only a- notice of
hearing. But it is habitually represented by counsel and "counsel for the Board, and
the trial examiner [chairman of the hearing acting for the Board], shall have power
to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce into the record.docu-
mentary and other evidence. ' .1sa
Later the Board issued instructions' 9 to its field staff concerning their duties, in-
cluding eventually very detailed instructions20 about the conduct of elections. As
the decisions of the Board are understandable without preliminary discussion of
procedure, we may at once turn to them.
4. THE EXISTENCE OF A REPRESENTATION QUESTION
Though the Act is vague, -' the NLRB in practice rarely, if ever, embarks upon an
investigation except when requested to do so by some union. 22 Employees, though
unorganized, might ask the Board to act.23 But the asserted unit must comprise
more than one employee, for the Board interprets the Act as giving to a sole employee
no bargaining rights.2
4
'The Rules of April 27, 1936, 1 N.L.R.B. 1032, are still in force. Art. III relates to Procedure for
the Investigation and Certification of Representatives. These rules, superseding those (of April 15, 1935)
of the first National Labor Relations Board (of which the present Board was the statutory successor),
were announced Sept. 14, 1935, and supplemented in a minor respect Oct. 16, 1935. Since neither the
statute nor the rules have been changed in any way since, the law relating to representation has been
developed entirely through adjudication of controversies by the Board.
s Rules, supra note 18, art. III, §5.
"
5Instructions to Staff Members, 9/17/35, Part III, Duties in Connectidn with the Certification of
Representatives under Section 9(c). "Conduct of Elections, C-49 (undated).
"Whenever a question affecting commerce arises concerning, the representation of employees, the
Board may investigate." NLRA §9(c).
' Recently it ordered elections, apparently not due to a petition, in Industrial Rayon Corp., 3 N.L.R.B.
No. 2 (1937); Chicopee Mfg. Corp., id. No. 88 (1937); Cjdahy Packing Co., id. No. oo (1937); and
Erwin Cotton Mills, 4 id. No. 134 (1938). But I am inf6rmed that the Board has never ordered the
holding of an election in the absence of a petition filed by employees or their represerltatives. (Personal
letter from NLRB Assistant General Counsel, March t4, 1938.) In these cases the "direction of election,"
which never mentions the petition, was issued without the usual accompanying "decision" stating the
,circumstances. I understand that a "decision" will follow in time. The Wisconsin Board ordered an
ekction without such a petition in Pfister Hotel, Aug. 30, 1937. Its Rules, art. III, §3, authorize this.
Cf. Wadsworth Watch Case Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1937); Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 5 id. No. 98,
p. 6 (1938).
'According to the Board's Rules, art. III, §1, the petition may be filed by "any employee or any
person or labor organization acting on his behalf." By the New York Act, §705.3, petitions by employers
are permitted. The State Labor Relations Acts, supra note 15, at 725.
"One man is not a unit, for he is said to be unable to be bargained for "collectively." Hildinger-
Bishop Co., i (first) N.L.R.B. 127 (1934); Luckenbach S. S. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 181, 193 (936); Schick Dry
Shaver Co., 4 id. No. 35, P. 7 (1937). NLRB, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 117.
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There may be no need of investigation, of course, if the employer already rec-
ognizes, and no one denies, that the petitioner is the exclusive representative25 of
the unit of employees that it claims to represent.20 But where the employer refuses
this recognition either absolutely or until the petitioner presents proof of its mandate,
or where there is a difference of opinion between employees or unions, there is a
case for the Board's determination.2 7 This determination means the answering of
the two principal, questions stated at the outset-what is the appropriate unit of
representation; and who is the desired representative, if any.28
A. Intra-Federation Disputes
The Board refuses to adjudicate representation controversies in which the con-
testants have a common superior competent to settle them. Thus a "jurisdictional"
dispute between two unions within the AFL will not be investigated by the Board,
whether the question is that of the appropriate representative (e.g., Is a local or a
national organization the proper agency to bargain? 29) or that of the appropriate
boundary between bargaining units (Are certain employees in one craft or the
other? 30 ). But the principle has been realistically applied, for after the AFL-CIO
cleavage became unquestionable, the Board determined representation controversies
between AFL unions and CIO unions even when the CIO union, though suspended,
was not expelled by the AFL.3'
B. The Effect of Existing Contracts
While the Board has thus properly recognized the possibility of obtaining settle-
ment of controversies through union self-government as a bar to its intervention, it
has repeatedly refused to recognize the existence of contracts, individual or collective,
concerning conditions of work or representation as a substantial (if any) impediment
to a determination by the Board. Unlike the National Labor Board and the first
National Labor Relations Board,3 2 the present Board has never yet32- let contracts
' Whatever the rights of minorities under the Act, they are not considered here. See The Labor Board
and the Courts (1938) 32 ILL. L. REv. 568, 595, and Rice, supra note i2, at 276.
'See note 133, infra.
"NLRB, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 105-108.
'Both questions arise also in cases where the employer is charged with having refused to bargain
under §8(5). See, e.g., Standard Lime & Stone Co., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 15, p. 8 (1938). Such cases, which
raise these questions as to the past, whereas representation cases raise them as to future bargaining, are
sparingly referred to herein as they appear to fall within the field of other writers. Compare note 144,
infra.
' Aluminum Co. of America, i N.L.R.B 530 (1936). Compare Alaska Juneau Gold Mining Co.,
2 id. 125, 142 (936): "It is neither the business of the Board nor [that] of an employer to inquire into
the manner in which labor organizations conduct their internal affairs."
' Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co., i N.L.R.B. 604 (1936).
"Interlake Iron Corp., 2 N.L.R.B. 1036 (June 26, 1937); Stone Knitting Mills Co., 3 id. No. 22
(1937); Curtis Bay Towing Co., 4 id. No. 53, P. 7 (1937); Showers Bros. Furniture Co., id. No. 77 and
77b (1937).
'Cleveland Knitting Mills, 2 N.L.B. 17 (1934); E. F. Caldwell and Co., x (first) N.L.R.B. 12, 14
(1934); Omaha and Council Bluffs Ry., id. x9o, 2 id. 45 (1934).
" (Postscript) The text has not been rewritten since the Board held in Superior Electric Products Co.,
March 17, 1938, 2 LABOR REL. REP. 130 (1938), that a contract duly made by a union empowered by the
Act (though not certified by the Board) to bargain for all .V~uld not be disturbfd. See note 56(6), inlra.
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stand in the way; though its theory of what becomes of them is not clear. In New
England Transportation Co. 33 existing individual (or possibly collective) contracts
were disregarded by the Board, which proclaimed "the freedom of employees to
change their representatives while at the same time continuing the existing agree-
ments."34 In Black Diamond Lines,35 Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd.3 6 and Panama R.R.
Co. 37 the Board, while not allowing contracts to impede certification, did not clarify
its theory regarding them. And in the R. C. A. Manufacturing Co. case, 38 wherein
the Board decided that a majority of those voting suffices to elect, it rejected the
provision of a contract (between the company and the contesting unions) which, as
construed by the company, declared a majoxity of those in the unit to be necessary
to a choice, because, so construed, it was "tantamount to a violation of the Act and
its declared policy and therefore cannot be given any effect by the Board." 39 If the
provision is regarded as a declaration of the union's intention not to claim exclusive
bargaining rights unless it should get an absolute majority, it is "subject to change at
any time, for a binding agreement preventing it from representing employees in
accordance with the Act would likewise be ... of no effect. Nor could the union be
said to be estopped by reason of any such agreement." The Board accordingly cer-
tified, as exclusive bargaining representative, the union that had received the majority
of votes cast.
Last summer the Board made several significant decisions refusing to let collective
agreements prevent determinations of representation. In Interlake Iron Co.4 ° a con-
tract to deal exclusively with the AFL did not stop the Board from directing an
election. In International Mercantile Marine Co.4 and American France Line42 in-
volving many ship lines, the National Maritime Union (CIO) with respect to its
33x N.L.R.B. 130, 138 (1936). Relying on the National Mediation Board's views regarding the effect
of a new certification on an existing collective agreement, the Board declared: "The whole process of
collective bargaining and unrestricted choice of representatives assumes the freedom of employees to change
their representatives while at the same time continuing the existing agreements under which the repre-
sentatives must' function." (This seems to make the contract one between the employer and an entity
consisting of his employees, though collective contracts purport to be between the employer and a union.)
"In John Blood & Co., i N.L.R.B. 371 (1936), the Board was not hindered by a certification of in-
dividuals two years before by the National Labor Board. Though these representatives had made an agree-
ment, it was not carried out by the employer and the representatives themselves then joined the union.
Practically the slate was clean. Compare Showers Bros. Furniture Co., infra note 77.
W2 N.L.R.B. 24r, 245 (936): "The mere holding of the election will in no way affect the rights
and duties, if any, arising out of the contract .... Since that contract is shortly subject to termination and
the representatives ... who will have been ascertained prior to that date, may elect to terminate it, we
deem it unnecessary to determine what would otherwise be the effect of the contract on the petition before
us." In Atlantic Footwear Co., Inc., 5 id. No. 35 (1938), a collective agreement to expire in three days,
said the Board, "presents no problem."
2 N.L.R.B. 2a, 287 (1936). The New England Transportation Co. doctrine is repeated. And the
Board adds: "Whichever organization is chosen as representative of the employees . . . will be free to
continue the existing agreement, to bargain concerning changes in the existing agreement, or to follow
the procedure provided therein for its termination."
2 N.L.R.B. 290 (1936). The status of the earlier contract with the defeated union is not discussed.
m R. C. A. Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 159 (1936). See note 4, supra, and p. ao, infra.
a,2 N.L.R.B. 179, citing Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. 16o (1929); Miller v. Ammon, 145 U. S. 42t
(x89a); Norman v. B. & 0. R. R., 294 U S. 240 (s935).
412 N.L.R.B. 1036 (937). 2 N.L.R.B. 971 (,1937). 4- 3 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1937).
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contracts with certain companies, and the International Seamen's Union (AFL) with
respect to its contracts with certain other companies, were each deemed, by petition-
ing for determination of representation, to have "waived its rights to assert the
existence of these contracts as a bar to elections. '43 But the Board did not rely on
waiver alone; the existence of contracts between employers and employees or repre-
sentatives of employees that had not filed petitions likewise did not "preclude the
holding of elections."'44 Again in City Auto Stamping Co.45 the Board ordered an
election despite existing contracts. As the union in making them acted for its mem-
bers only,,it was "unnecessary to decide what the effect on the holding of an election
would be if the contracts purported to name the exclusive bargaining agent for the
employees," said the Board. "For the present" it held these contracts to remain in
force, while their continued existence "after the certification of exclusive bargaining
agents by the Board can be made the subject of agreement between the company and
such agents." This seems to indicate that if a new agent is designated, the new agent
steps in not to administer the old agreement, but rather to make a new one (if the
union and the employer can agree). It is uncertain, however, how long "the present"
lasts. Is it till a new agent is certified or is it till the new agent and the employer
agree to terminate the existing agreement; or has the new agent an option, regardless
of the employer's wishes, to continue the agreement (substituting itself as adminis-
trator of it?) or to terminate it? In the next case 40 where contracts were alleged to
bar a determination of representatives, the Southeastern Greyhound Lines had made
three contracts whereby it agreed to recognize the other party's officers as "repre-
sentatives of the members of said association in negotiations with the company."
But the Board merely says, "Regardless of the status of these contracts prior to an
election and certification by the Board,,it is clear that their survival is subject to the
outcome of such election." And of course any other view of contracts of this char-
acter would fatally clog the operation of the Act. In Northrop Corporation,17 the
Board turned to the R. C. A. case 48 as precedent for its refusal to give any effect to
an agreement between the employer and the union by which the latter, though
known by an unofficial election to be the choice of the majority, was expressly rec-
ognized as the representative only of its members for collective bargaining. "The
Act and not the particular agreement furnishes the rule that must guide the Board
in its determination. The agreement in this case cannot foreclose the claim of the
Union to be certified as the exclusive representative .... Nor can the Union be said
to be estopped by reason of such agreement. The agreement therefore has no effect
upon the determination of the issues in this proceeding."
In The Texas Oil Co.4" the Board was asked by the International Association of
Id., p. 8. 4"Ibid.
43 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1937). The quotations are from pages 6 and 7. Accord: McKesson & Robbins,
5 id. No. 12, p. 12 (1938).
"Penna. Greyhound Lines, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 69, p. 25 (Sept. 14, 1937).
473 N.L.R.B. No. 19a (Oct. 6, 1937). Contracts of the same sort, but with a proviso looking to an
eventual NLRB determination, existed in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 id. No. 24 (1937), and other cases.
"Supra note 38. "4 N.L.R.B. No. 27 (1937).
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Machinists (AFL) to give effect, in determining the unit for bargaining, to a nation-
wide contract between it and the petitioning Oil Workers (CIO). 5° The Board said:
"The contention of the I. A. M., that the appropriate unit for collective bargaining is the
craft unit, is based upon an agreement between the Oil Workers and the I. A. M., in which
the Oil'Workers agreed not to-accept or retain in their membership, men employed in the
petroleum industry over whom the I. A. M. had been granted jurisdiction by the American
Federation of Labor. The agreement was entered into on October 26, 1935, when the Oil
Workers were still affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. The question of
whether this agreement is still in effect, since the two parties to it no longer recognize the
jurisdiction of the same parent body, does not concern us here. At least in the absence of a
parent body to which the parties might look for the enforcement of such an agreement, it
cannot be given controlling weight."5 1
But whether there be such a change in the identity of a party as to destroy the exist-
ence of the contract or such a change of circumstances as to amount to impossibility
or as to come within an implied rebus sic stantibus,52 matters little; for such a con-
tract, any more than a contract of like sort with the employer, can not control a
determination of representation. Such an agreement might be significant as showing
the preference of the employees.5 3 Here it was not, for no employee at these par-
ticular works was a member of the I. A. M.
The Kinnear case,54 relying on the Northrop case,55 excludes supervisory em-
ployees from the bargaining unit in which an election was ordered, despite their
having been counted in to establish the majority behind a contract which the com-
pany had signed with the Independent Union. The majority thus destroyed, an elec-
' Such a stipulation between unions was followed by the Board in fixing unit boundaries in Associated
Press, 5 N.L.R.B. No. 6, p. 6 (1938).
M 4 N.L.R.B. No. 27, p. 4-5. This change of affiliation of the (inter-)national, not changing its identity,
should be distinguished from a change of affiliation of a local. There is authority for the view that a
local exists by virtue of its charter; if the charter is surrendered or withdrawn, the entity is extinguished,
even though its members individually or collectively join or form a local of some other national union.
Penna. LRB v. Red Star Shoe Repairing Co., Inc., 3 MONTHLY Bu.L. L. IND. RIoHs 16 (Ct. of Com.
Pleas, Phila. Cty., Dec. 15, 1937) (reversing determination of Oct. 14, 1937 of the LRB which had
treated as valid the substitution, in an AFL closed shop contract, of a CIO local, to which the employees
had switched); M & M Woodworking Co. v. Plymouth & Veneer Workers, I LABOR REL. RaP. 607 (D.
Ore. Jan. 7, 1938). Contra: World Trading Corp. v. Kolchin, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 15o (Sup. Ct., X938) citing
cases; Cassetana v. Filling Station Operators Union (Cal. Super. Ct., 1937) 3 MONTHLY BULL. L. IND.
RtGTs 57 (closed shop agreement with AFL union and "successors," protects members of both AFL
and CIO rival successor unionsf)
'LAuTEPAcHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (1933) Pt. IV, §Iz.
'" The existence of a practice of collective bargaining by crafts is of course highly persuasive in the
Board's determination of units for bargaining. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass CO., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 30
(1937). But the Board is not concerned with preserving contracts so much as with respecting employees'
self-organizatibn for bargaining. Curtis Bay Towing Co., id. No. 53, p. 8 (937); American Hardware
Corp., id. No. 58, at p. 7-9 (1937); Worthington Pump and Machinery Corp., id. 6r (1937) (with dis-
sent). A stipulation of the company (with whom?) regarding units was, however, said to have been given
some effect in Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 2 id. 767, 769 (1937). See Penna. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
3 id. No. 69, p. 13 (1937); Pacific Greyhound Lines, 4 id. No. 72, R. 17 (1937). But in the Santa Fe
case the petitioner, whose wish was respected, was the only group of employees heard from, while in the
later cases there was employee opposition to the unit proposed (bus drivers).
"Kinnear Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1938).
'Supra note 47. Also Wilmington Transportation Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 132, p. 5 (1938), rejects a
collective contract "especially since the agreement was entered into subsequent to the time that the petition
in this case was filed" and refers to the Northrop case as authority.
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tion was ordered. Nothing was said about the interim validity of the contract, which
by its terms applied to all employees who signed the contract, the union to become
exclusive representative (and apparently the contract to be extended to all) only in.
the event of majority adherence.5 6
There are also several cases in which the Board has disregarded contracts purport-
ing to bind all employees when they have been made by a group not authorized by
the requisite majority.57 These contracts are void; whereas those previously men-
tiofed are merely subordinate to the due procedure for making collective agreements
and are superseded by these agreements." Agreements induced by fraud have like-
wise been disregarded.5 9
All through its determinations the Board insists that the right of employees to
choose bargaining representatives can not be affected by contracts which purport to
restrict the means or effect of such designation, or by contracts not based on the
statutory authority to bind all in a bargaining unit. But the Board is not yet sure
what should be done with existing collective contracts lawfully made and applying
'Contracts were considered also in the following recent cases: (x) In Novelty Slipper Co., 5
N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1938), the contract of the A union had been taken over by the B union after winning
a consent election in July 1937, under an agreement between the unions giving each other clearance for
"existing or future contracts made, or to be made, where the other union represents a majority of the
votes cast." Now the A union, claiming a majority, seeks a new election, which the Board directs. (2) In
Waterfront Employers Ass'n, 4 id. No. 143 (1938), there was a collective agreement with a union other
than petitioner; but the evidence on this and other matters being vague, the Board refused to certify the
petitioner (despite its majority in the unit it contended for) and remanded the proceeding. (3) In News
Syndicate Co., Inc., id. No. Izf9 (1938), the Newspaper Guild obtained a certification by presenting
membership application cards as evidence of majority choice- Its slight margin perhaps would have
disappeared if certain border groups had been added to the unit. The Board, in sustaining the exclusion
of the editorial workers, which the Guild desired, pointed to the lack of objection by the employer and
to the employer's contract with that group, and concluded by confining its decision to "the present special
circumstances." (4) In Daily Mirror, Inc., 5 id. No. 59, P. 5 (1938), the Board found that the re-
spondent after negotiation with the Newspaper Guild had made not a contract but a unilateral declaration
regarding demands of editorial employees. Hence it did not express an "opinion as to what effect, if any,
an actual agreement covering only editorial employees would have" had. (5) In Postal Telegraph Cable
Co., cases R-329, etc., the Board issued Feb. 12, 1938, and soon withdrew, a decision which involved
collective contracts. (6) Finally there is Superior Electric Products Co., supra note 32a, in which the
Board dismissed a petition due to the existence of a contract governing all. It did so because the duration
of the contract (one year, with four months still to run) was not so long "as to be contrary to the
policies and purposes of the Act" and because a majority of the employees in the craft which the peti-
tioner asked to have set up as a unit had favored the execution of the contract when it was made. "Under
these circumstances we will not proceed . . . until . . . the contract is about to expire."
' This rule antedates the present Board. Tamaqua Underwear Co., x (first) N.L.R.B. 10 (t934).
Among recent cases the following are typical. Stone Knitting Mills, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 22 (937), treated
a collective contract as negligible in considering a petition because of "the interference and coercion on
the part of the companies." So Friedman Blau Farber Co., 4 id. No. 23 (1937), and Zenitc Metal Corp.,
5 id. No. 73 (938). In American-West African Line, 4 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1938), the NLRB found
a closed shop agreement was worthless because made by a non-majority agency. The Board disregarded
closed shop contracts made with a non-majority agency in Hill Bus Co., 2 id. 781 (1937) (contract does
not justify discharge of employees who refuse to join), and in National Electric Products Co., 3 id. No. 47
(1937) (contract does not prevent an election), though specific performance of each of these contracts
had already been decreed by a court. In the last case the union that had made the contract won the
election, id. 47b (1937). Was the contract then always valid, despite the Board's first decision?
"' But see NLRB v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 9o F. (ad) 520 (3rd, 1937), cert. denied, 58 Sup.
Ct. 141 (1937) (individual contracts with all employees made without observing NLRB's order to bar-
gain collectively make the order moot). Criticized in (1937) 51 HARv. L. REv. 358.
' McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 12, p. 12 (1938).
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to all. Will it increase stability to let them temporarily delay (if they run for only a
limited period) a new designation? Or to allow them to be taken over by a new
representative? Or to treat them as ended by the designation of a new representative?
In fact the status of all employment contracts after a statutory bargaining agency,
or a new statutory bargaining agency, has been selected but before it has reached
an agreement with the employer for canceling, continuing, or superseding the con-
tracts, remain quite uncertain. And the answer may of course be different for con-
tracts which an employer has made: (i) with individual employees; (2) with a
union for its members or with a group of employees through a union as their agent;
(3) with a statutory collective bargaining representative (designee of majority, bar-
gaining for all). In the last situation, there is the subsidiary question whether the
new representative takes over the administration of the old contract. Probably all
lawful contracts, or at least all except those between the employer -and an agency
which at the time was acting as statutory representative of all the employees, remain
in force according to their terms until overruled by some new agreement between
the employer and the new representative. Though from one point of view a contract
which has been made in fulfillment of the statute is entitled to greater respect than
any other, yet after the naming of a new representative (with or without drawing of
new unit boundaries) the continuation of the old agency as representative of all
employees (within the old unit) in the administration of the pre-existing contract is
incongruous with the status of the new agency as the sole agency for bargaining
with the employer. Yet the substitution of the new agency in the administration of
the old contract is an impossible compromise between its termination on the naming
of the new representative (or at the option of the new representative) and its con-
tinuation until the new representative and the employer together agree to terminate
it. Obviously this is so, if the new certification involves a change of unit boundaries;
and, even if the unit is unchanged, the employer may be unwilling to be bound by
the same contract with one organization as with another, and its terms may be quite
inconsistent with the principles or frame of organization of the new bargaining
agency. So, despite what the Board at first said, I believe the substitution doctrine
can not stand. The problem of the obliterative effect, on existing (or subsequent)
contracts relating to employment, of the designation of a statutory representative or
of the making of a statutory agreement, is a problem beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.5g" But it is now quite clear that contracts, with the possible exception of statutory
agreements (as to which it has not yet clearly ruled"ob), do not and should not bar
the Board's determining representation questions.
C. Recent Investigation
Another possible temporary obstacle to making a determination of representation
is that the Board has recently held an election or made a certification. 60 If the elec-
' NLRA §9(a), like the corresponding provisions of the Railway Labor Act, is said by the Supreme
Court not to preclude the making of individual contracts. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S.
1, 45 (1937). s"b But see notes 32a and 56(6), supra.
"Though neither the Act nor the Rules make a certification conclusive, "in the absence of proof to
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tion has been inconclusive or negative, resulting in no certification, it is evidence for
a while that another election would be equally futile. But as soon as conditions are
shown to have changed, so that a choice would be probable, the Board should not
refuse to proceed. If, on the other hand, a determination has been made, it would
seem unduly disturbing to good employment relations to give opportunity to over-
throw that determination until there arises and continues for some time a probability
that the majority of employees desires such an opportunity.61
D. Instability of Conditions
Another temporary obstacle which has been recognized by the Board is the im-
possibility of holding a fair election until unfair labor practices have been righted.
Typical is Lenox Shoe Co.,62 where the Board said:
"We shall not at this time set the date for holding an election but shall direct that the
election be delayed until such time as the Board is satisfied that there has been sufficient
compliance with its order to dissipate the effect of the unfair labor practices of the re-
spondent and to permit an election uninfluenced by the respondent's conduct."
Two months later the election was ordered.63
Even a state of flux in employee organization not due to any unfair practices of
the employer would seem a ground for postponement, for the purpose of an election
(or determination by other means) is to eitablish a degree of stability in collective
bargaining without which, a mutually satisfactory scheme of employment relations
can not be achieved.
5. THE CONSTITUENCY
Particularly in a period of rivalry between two national groupings of workmen,
embodying somewhat diverse patterns of organization, the determination of the unit
of employee representation is of outstanding importance. But the Board in delimiting
the bargaining unit is by no means confined to deciding between a craft and an
industrial set-up. Every case presents special problems-problems of geography and
history, as well as problems of anatomy of the business' structure and the employees'
self-organization. It is impossible to say. "These are the rules," for one can not go
much beyond what the Board itself has done in stating several principal considera-
the contrary, there is a presumption that a majority secured by the union in the election . . . continued."
U. S. Stamping Co., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 29, p. 11 (1938). Compare N. Y. LRB Rules, art. III, §ix ("certifica-
tion shall remain in effect for a period of one year" unless ... ) and Wis. LRB Rules, art. III, §6 ("this
certificate shall be conclusive until revoked by the Board . .
"See notes 32 and 56 (1), supra. Cf. Showers Bros. Furniture Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (x937); N. Y.
& Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 2 id. 585, 605 (1937). Compare The State Labor Relations Acts, supra note 15,
at 726. At present it is not customary to choose representatives for a stated period; collective contracts,
however, usually have terminal dates. A contrary practice in both respects would have advantages when
labor conditions become more settled.
04 N.L.R.B. No. 54 (1937). On its facts this case is rather closely paralleled by the Freeman Shoe
case, note 8, above, now before the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The national and the state acts are sus-
ceptible of different constructions, however, particularly as to closed shop agreements. See Rice, supra
note 16.
G5 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (1938). Another case of postponement is Todd Shipyards Corp. id. No. 9, p. 6
(1938).
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tions, above all, that the wishes of the employees themselves if they are clear, should
prevail. Where different employee groups8 4 propose different unit boundaries, based
on different considerations, the Board is more and more often leaving the determina-
tion of the unit itself to the outcome of the election of representatives, thus giving the
greatest possible reach to self-determination. If Newfoundland prefers to stay out of
the Dominion of Canada and the other colonies of the federation are willing, if
Norway and Sweden both wish to separate, there is no problem. The problem arises
when thirteen colonies in 1776 declare their independence and Great Britain won't
agree to it; when the Confederate States wish to secede and the United States fights
"to preserve the Union." And though there is no doubt that Ireland is entitled to
"home rule," there still remains the question whether the emerald isle should consist
of two units of government or one. In such a case the National Labor Relations
Board, having made a preliminary judgment that Ireland should not be united unless
both Ulster and the South desire it, conducts simultaneous votes in both parts of
Ireland and unites them only if both votes are favorable to unification. The plebiscites
of the NLRB take the form, however, of votes for or against, not separation itself,
but the labor union which favors separation, for in labor relations such desires are
embodied in the union. Thus if the question is whether the A group of employees
should be a bargaining unit, as contended for by the petitioning union, or should
form part of a larger AB unit (perhaps desired by another union), the Board fre-
quently orders an election by electoral units which it considers possible bargaining
units. If the A group is such, the Board announces that if this electoral unit is carried
by the petitioner, it will be recognized as a separate bargaining unit; otherwise it will
form part of the AB unit.65
Views of the employer are not disregarded but they rarely prevail if they differ from those of the
candidate--or candidates. Merchants' & Miners' Transportation Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 747, 750, is exceptional in
this respect. As examples of the usual treatment, see Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., i N.L.B. 58 (1933);
Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., i (first) N.L.R.B. 94, 97 (1934); Luckenbach S. S. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 18r,
187 (1936); Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 3 id. No. 51 (1937); Hoffman Beverage Co., id. No. 64 (1937).
The desire of the employer, where unions disagree, seems to count especially for large geographical units.
American Woolen Co., 5 id. No. 24 (938); Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 5 id. No. 98 (938).
'This device was first set forth in cases decided Aug. i, a937, City Auto Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B.
No. 24, and The Globe Machine and Stamping Co., id. No. 25 (1937). (In both cases the industrial
union carried the craft electoral units and the Board thereupon found the larger unit appropriate' and
certified accordingly. Id. No. 24a, No. 25b.) The device has been repeatedly used to resolve this sort of
conflict of rival unions differing in structure. It is in general a determination for the 'smallest unit
that desires autonomy in bargaining, and, as actually applied, in particular a determination for craft
unionism wherever the employees in a craft group are more craft-conscious than plant-conscious. For a
more complicated application of this technique, see Pacific Gas & Electric Co., id. No. 87, p. 16 (937);
4 id. No. 26 (1937); 5 id. No. 50 (1938) (several unions).
Though the doctrine that employees' wishes must prevail is almost as clearly recognized by the
states, particularly Massachusetts, Dorothy Muriel, Inc. (Mass. L. R. Comm'n, Dec. so, 1937), the
technique of provisional classification and election is not in use. The Wisconsin Board, in the Simmons
Co. (Kenosha plant) election (Oct. 15, 1937), by agreement of the contesting unions, each of which had
a majority in one of the two units that might be established in the plant, put to the vote of the employees
whether they would prefer to have an A unit and a B unit, or a single AB unit. Naturally the members
of the union which believed it had an over-all majority voted for the AB unit, and established it in the
plant. This use of the plebiscite, whereby the vote in the inclusive unit determines whether there should
or should not be smaller bargaining units, has nothing to recommend it, unless all candidates agree to it:
20I
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The one exact rule that the Board has laid down, to wit, that a collective bargain-
ing unit must comprise more than one employee,60 seems to me objectionable. It
emphasizes unduly, or construes too etymologically, the word "collective." What the
Act does is to establish a new system of employment relations-a fixing of conditions
of work by joint action of employer and employees (acting, if they will and as they
normally do, through organizations), thereby strengthening the pre-existing "agree-
ment system." The method of negotiating the agreement is called "collective bar-
gaining."67 Though the term implies that many employees are affected by the
negotiation, the essence of the term is not the number affected but the method of
joint deliberation and agreement of the employer and the representative of his em-
ployees. The word "collective" is merely descriptive of the usual situation07' Surely
one man in dealing with the employer is, if anything, in greater need than a group
of employees of the backing of an act which seeks to redress "the inequality of bar-
gaining power between employees . . . and employers."' 8 Moreover, the fact that
there is one man in the unit at a particular moment does not mean that this situation
will prevail for the period for which a certification will normally establish a r'gime.
The number of employees fluctuates, but bargaining representation remains constant
unless the majority of employees desires a change. The mere fact that the majority
may change more suddenly when few employees are concerned is a consideration
adverse to the setting up of small units but not one for denying the possibility of a
unit in which there is only one member. 609 Bargaining is for the future as well as
the present. A bargaining unit is not merely the persons who vote for a represent-
ative nor those allowed to vote in the event of an election; 70 it is all those who at
any time work within the boundaries of the municipality, if one may so call it,
which is established by the Board. It would, in my opinion, be entirely proper for
the Board to establish or recognize a bargaining unit consisting of one employee.
On the other hand, the unit normally comprises only employees of one employer.
Nevertheless there are several cases where two or more employers act together to such
an extent that employees of both together form a unit for bargaining. 71 Though such
a unit appears to be larger than that which the Act prescribes, no objection to it has
been raised in any of these cases.
"'See note 24, supra.
' "Collective bargaining is simply a means to an end. The end is an agreement." Houde Engineering
Co., x (first) N.L.R.B. 35, 39 (934), referring, to NIRA §7(a).
" Cf. Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. I. C. C., 286 U. S. 299, 3o6 (1933) ("interurban electric
railway").
T NLRA §i, par. 2. ' Compare (1935) so Wis. L. REV. 406.
' Thus eligibility to vote is usually determined by employment during the payroll period preceding
the filing of the petition. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 4 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1937); Canadian Fur Trappers
Corp., id. No. io9 (1938).
'International Mercantile Marine Co., i N.L.R.B. 384 (1936); Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., Inc., 2 id. 102
(1936); American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., id. 424 (1936); Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 4 id. No. 109
(938); Mackay Radio Corp. of Del., Inc., 5 id. No. 89 (1938); The Triplett Electrical Instrument Co.,
id. No. i 12, p. x9 (1938). But compare Penna. Salt Mfg. Co., 3 id. No. 74, P. 5 (1937), and Red River
Lumber Co., 5 id. No. 90, p. zo (938). So several employers may be jointly liable for unfair labor
practices. Clark & Reid Co., Inc., 2 id. 516 (x936); William Randolph Hearst, id. 530 (1937); Bell Oil
& Gas Co., id. 577 (1937); id. 886 (1937).
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A. Classification Based on Geography
Let us take up the simplest question first, that of physical distance. Though the
plebiscite device mentioned above might be used for deciding whether physically
separated groups of employees should form one or several bargaining units, actually
it has not been so used, the Board having always decided upon testimony given at
the hearing whether remoteness demanded separation of employees into two or more
bargaining units. But no measure of distance can be laid down, for the decision is
ruled by considerations of current personnel practice (particularly interchange of
workers), recent bargaining customs and above all by present desires of employees.
Thus in Chase Brass & Copper Co.,72 the Board recognized that the desire of the
employees for the single plant unit should prevail over that of the employer for a
larger one. In transportation employment physical separation means less than in
other undertakings. 3 But even among workers engaged in transport itself, geograph-
ical limitations desired by them are respected.
7 4
But where the situation is complicated by interunion rivalries, the Board makes
its own appraisal based on several factors. Soon after the Chase case it had to bound
the bargaining units for the employees of the American Hardware Corporation
which had four plants in one city. 75 Here there were several unions, all opento
employees in all plants and three of them desiring the four plants not to be separated.
Two others asked that one plant be made a separate unit. In the Chase case, said the
Board, it had "held the employees of two plants in the same city with a common
management to be separate units on the ground that the employees had organized
and bargained on that basis. No organization along the lines of a multiple plant
unit had commenced in that case. Such is not the situation here.... To hold that
each plant in New Britain constituted a separate unit would hamper organization
already started along broader lines. Further the plants are not situated so far apart
geographically that there is any difficulty in holding meetings of the employees from
all four plants. The factors of centralized management of all plants and of organiza-
tion among employees of all plants .. .lead to the conclusion that no distinction
should be made along plant lines in determining the unit.
76
12 4 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1937) (petitioner had members at only one of two plants, two miles apart, under
common management and, in part, doing the same type of work; another union was established at the
other plant).
Even when the unit consists only of garage workers. New England Transportation Co., i N.L.R.B.
130 (1936) (employees in 13 garages in 4 states constitute a unit-no disagreement on unit). In countless
maritime cases, each ship has never been treated as a bargaining unit, all of a company's employees in a
particular occupation being the unit.
"Motor Transport Co., 2 N.LR.B. 492 (1937).
American Hardware Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1937) (four plants, situated in two groups three-
quarters of a mile apart; respondent does not transfer employees between plants; "some plants fabricate
materials used by the other plants .... To a great extent, however, each plant is independent of the
others ... ").
"Id., at p. 6. So in other cases where unions disagree the Board inclines to the larger unit. Ohio
Foundry Co., 3 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (z937) (one union desired a unit comprising three plants; another
union, a unit of one plant; a third union, a unit of another plant; on the basis of the kind of work done,
t&e Board set up one unit of one plant; one of the other two). And see American Woolen Co., 5 id. No;
24 (1938) (three mills within a radius of three or four miles; petition for election in one mill dismissed
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The Board in two recent meat packers' cases seems at first sight to have come to
somewhat inconsistent conclusions. In Swift & Co.7 the Board found that the com-
pany had 375 branch houses in the United States of which two were in Los Angeles.
At one of these, the one which the petitioning (nationally affiliated) union desired
to have recognized as a bargaining unit, there was slaughtering, processing, and dis-
tribution, and at the other, two miles away, processing and distribution. A rival
(non-affiliated) union and the company both urged a single unit for both plants,
which had common management. It further appeared that transfers of employees
from one plant to the other were frequent and that the company had completed
plans for the consolidation of the two plants by the enlargement of the second plant,
which the company expected to have completed within a year. In the Chase case78
also consolidation of the two plants was being considered but had "admittedly not
reached the status of a definitely scheduled move." In the Swift case, the greater
probability of consolidation seems to have been an important factor in bringing the
Board to dismissal of the petition, without prejudice to the presertation of a petition
for the investigation and certification of representatives of employees at both plants
together. (The Board does not certify for a larger unit than the one asked by the
petitioner,78s though it will for a smaller one when it deems it appropriate.) Iiut
only a few days later in Armour & Co., 79 without referring to any earlier case, the
Board treated each of ii branch houses doing processing and distributing in Greater
New York (there being 28 meat packing houses and about 300 branch houses through-
out the United States) as a separate bargaining unit, according to the desire of the
only union in the field, the company offering no objection. There is no inconsistency
between the cases, however, when we note that here the wishes of the only articulate
employees prevailed.80
From this review of the chief cases it is obvious that physical separation of some
workers from other workers, is a minimal factor in unit determination. It affects
the Board only indirectly, that is, through its influence on management arrangements
and bargaining practices and desires of employees. Where there is unity of opinion
as it is not a separate unit); Standard Oil Co. of Cal., id. No. 98 (938); and American Steel and Wire
Co., id. No. x16 (1938). Notwithstanding some discussion of geographical separation in Hoffman
Beverage Co., 3 id. No. 64 (1937), and Shell Chemical Co., 4 id. No. 36 (1937), these decisions rest
chiefly on functional or craft separation of a group found at only one plant.
774 N.L.R.B. No. 96 (r938). " Supra note 72, at p. 4.
"' See also American Woolen Co. and Standard Oil Co. of Cal., both supra note 76. For craft
boundaries the rule is perhaps less absolute. Great Lakes Engineering Works, 5 N.L.R.B. No. xo6 (1938).
.04 N.L.R.B. No. r15 (1938).
'This, too, is clearly the ground of Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (1938). And
only the Board's respect for the wishes of the employees harmonizes other cases. Compare Shell Oil Co.,
2 id. 835 (1937) (all California one unit), and Mackay Radio Corp. of Del., Inc., 5 id. No. 89 (1938)
(all U. S. one unit), with R.C.A. Communications, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1og, 1115 (937) (New York
metropolitan unit); Associaied Press, id. No. 6 (1938) (separate units for Washington, Boston, and
Philadelphia); and Spray Woolen Mills, id. No. 63 (1938) (five mills in three towns; each to be a
separate unit). The gradual emergence of the preponderant importance of the wishes of any organized
group of employees (as against unorganized employees) seems to account for the change from a two-plant
unit in Gordon Baking Co., 2 N.L.B. 53 (June 1934), to two units on reconsideration of the same case,
i (first) N.L.R.B. 1o (Oct. 1934).
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as to the appropriate unit, among the employees concerned, that opinion will prevail,
however widely spread the unit may be. Where there is disunity, the Board considers
physical factors, but only as they affect management arrangements and would be
likely to affect the stability of collective dealing.
B. Classification by Craft
Vertical classification of employees is more frequently on a craft basis than on
one of geographical separation. Again the preference of the employees is the chief
determinant."' But, under present circumstances, there is likely to be a sharp con-
flict of opinion between employees, some for, some against, craft separation. It is now
habitual for the Board to resort to the use of balloting by employees to decide
such conflicts,812 thereby giving to the employees' wishes a controlling effect in favor
of the craft,83 or at least the less inclusive, unit, wherever a majority of its voters so
desire. Thus when the United Electrical and Radio Workers petitioned for a
determination of representation of the employees of the American Hardware Cor-
poration, and it appeared that there were craftsmen who desired craft union represent-
atives, an election, offering a choice between the petitioner and the International
Association of Machinists was ordered8 4 in an electoral unit comprising machinists,
tool makers and die makers.8 5 Later, upon the U.E.R.W.'s asking to be withdrawn
from the ballot in this election, the Board modified its direction of election so that
the ballot offered the employees a Yes-No choice as to the I. A. M.8 6 The majority
vote having been Yes, the Board made a supplemental finding of fa&t that the
machinists, tool makers and die makers constituted "a unit appropriate for the
purpose of collective bargaining" and certified the I. A. M.
8 7
Examination of early cases would add little to what has already been -written.8S
But some recent decisions should be mentioned, particularly because they have given
nPenna. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 69, p. 13 (1937). And, where the Board might
"find either the smaller or the larger unit to be appropriate for collective bargaining," it "will be
governed by the wishes of the employees [in the proposed smaller unit] themselves." Wilmington Trans-
portation Co., id. No. 132 (938). Though in News Syndicate, Inc., supra note 56, the Board (unwisely?)
overruled a craft's desire for exclusion, and though in Pacific Greyhound Lines, quoted at note 99, below,
it speaks of the results of an election as only "in part" decisive, yet it will be seen that the Board almost
always gives the employees' desire to bargain through a craft union preponderant effect. 'the Board's cau-
tious language may be due in part to fear of the unconstitutionality of subdelegation. See Notes (1932) 32
COL. L. REV. 8o; (i937) 37 COL. L. REv. 447; Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups (937) 51 HAv.
L. REv. 201. 'See note 65, supra.
'The New York LRA, §705.2, requires craft units if the craftsmen so desire: "In any case where
the majority of employees of a particular craft shall so decide the Board shall designate such craft as a
unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining."
un4 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (Dec. 4, 1937), E. S. Smith explaining in a separate opinion that he concurred
because the craft union was organized and bargaining a year before the industrial union organization
was started in the respondent's plants.
The election by the employees in these groups was to determine whether they desired to be repre-
sented by the industrial or the craft union, "or by neither."
so4 N.L.R.B. No. 58a (Dec. 17, 1937). See note 94, infra. 81 4 N.L.R.B. No. 58b (Jan. 17, 1938).
'See, e.g., NLRB, FIasr ANNUAL REPORT (936) 112-120; SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 104-
140; (1937) 12 iVs. L. REv. 367; The Labor Board and the Courts (938) 32 ILL. L. Rav. 568, 593-61o;
Stix, The Appropiate Bargaining Unit under the Wagner Act (1938) 23 WAsH. U. L. Q. 156 (summariz-
ing many cases not covered herein, especially unit determinations made in §8 cases). In weighing NLRB
decisions before last August, as well as all state board decisions, one needs to be mindful of the NLRB's
present practice of polling employees to learn their wishes.
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rise to dissenting opinions by Mr. Edwin S. Smith, ending a two year record of
unanimity in the Board's pronouncements.8 9
One of the most difficult representation cases that the Board has handled was that
initiated June 14, 1937, by a petition of Local 248 of the United Automobile
Workers (CIO) asking for a determination of representation at the West Allis,
Wisconsin, plant of the Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.90 The main contest was between
the petitioner and several AFL craft unions. An AFL federal union, formed in 1936,
absorbed a large share of some of these unions' membership and thereby came into
such conflict with the national craft organizations that its members voted to join the
CIO in a body in March, 1937 and in substance transformed themselves into Local
248, the petitioner. There was also an Independent Association composed of technical
engineers and draftsmen employed by the company, which wished to represent
those groups of employees.
The Board made a careful investigation of the history of these organizations in
the respondent's plant. The CIO local which had made a contract, only for its mem-
bers, in May, 1937, asked for a single unit, inclusive of all production and main-
tenance workers. The Board, however, gave opportunity to the employees in par-
ticular crafts to assert their autonomy, and ordered elections where there was doubt
as to a group's preference.
Unanimously the Board decided that the engineers and draftsmen together were
entitled to separate bargaining if a majority so desired. It was shown that their
bargaining agency had negotiated with the employer for some years and had made
a contract, for its members only, in June, 1937. They were provided a ballot which
offered them the choice of representation by Local 248, by the Independent Asso-
ciation, or by neither.
Leaving clerical workers aside (though Local 248 wanted them included) because
their functions and problems differed so from those of production workers that it
would be inappropriate to include them "in the absence of ... evidence" (apparently,
of some desire on their part to participate in collective bargaining), the Board
(Messrs. Madden and D. W. Smith) found two craft groups sufficiently self-conscious
to warrant separation if they so desired. One consisted of maintenance electricians.
Though the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers could show no remain-
ing strength among the electrical production workers, it claimed a majority of "this
well-defined group" of maintenance employees. The Board also recognized as a pos-
sible unit a group of operative engineers, among whom the International Brotherhood
of Firemen and Oilers (though its local was not organized till 1937) had become
strong enough to make a contract, for its members only, with the employer in June
1937. Each ballot offered the choice between CIO Local 248, the AFL local, or
neither.
'His first recorded dissent was in Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (Nov. 2o, 1937). He
had once before delivered a separate opinion (on another question). Matter of Pacific S. S. Co., 2 id. 214,
230 (1936). No other Board member has announced individual views.
'Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1937). The hearings took over two weeks.
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Mr. Edwin S. Smith objected to these dispositions, insisting that a choice vitally
affecting all employees should not be entrusted to these small groups. "If the oilers
and firemen and the skilled maintenance electricians bargain separately, by so much
is the united economic strength of the employees as a whole weakened. Anything
which weakens the bargaining power of the employees will tend to lessen reliance
upon peaceful collective bargaining as the means for achieving the workers' economic
ends. Such a tendency is plainly contrary to the purposes of the Act." In short he
is for unitary government rather than "states' rights," though he stands for employee
self-determination 9 ' as valiantly as his colleagues. But self-determination means to
him unification if the majority of all desire it; while to them it means segmentation
to whatever extent a segment desires autonomy.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. thus led to four elections which resulted in four certifica-
tions, for each of the three craft groups won its sectional election, while Local 248
prevailed in a Yes-No election in the rest of the plant.92
Schick Dry Shaver Co.93 is a very similar conflict between a CIO industrial union
and a group of craft unions. The maintenance employees (electricians, carpenters
and machinists) desired separate craft units. Tool production makers also petitioned
to be separate and were put into the same voting unit as machinists in the main-
tenance department, being eligible to the same AFL union. Accordingly for the
election these three craft units and a residual unit were set up, the bargaining units
to depend on the outcome of the vote.9 4 Mr. Smith dissented briefly, referring to
what he had said in the Allis-Chalmers case.
In American Hardware Corporation,95 the situation was similar, but this time
Mr. Smith agreed with the craft separation because of the bargaining activities of the
International Association of Machinists (AFL) in the plant before the United Elec-
trical & Radio Workers (CIO) began to organize. Machinists, tool makers, and die
makers were accordingly given a chance to choose between the two unions (or
neither) while the rest of the workmen voted Yes or No as to the United.96
o "The decision vests in the hands of a small group of employees the choice of determining whether
in this mass-production plant, employing nearly io,ooo workers, a complete industrial unit, or one from
which one or more crafts have been severed, is most appropriate to promote collective bargaining. By this
pseudo-democratic method a determination of the greatest consequence to the other employees in the plant
is left in the hands of groups known to be hostile to industrial organization. The wishes of the great
majority of the employees are ignored. The device of holding such an election to resolve the conflict
between industrial union adherents and craft conscious groups, as here represented by the oilers and
firemen, is obviously inadequate to throw any light on the problem of what is the most appropriate bar-
gaining unit. Permitting minorities to set themselves off, as all the indications are they would do in this
instance, succeeds in providing full self-determination for the minority but only at the expense of entirely
disregarding the interests of the majority." 035 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (938).
4 N.L.R.B. No. 35 (Nov. 29, 1937). One painter was denied unit standing. See note 24, supra.
o' Before the election the CIO local withdrew its petition. The Board thereupon called the general
election off, found the craft units appropriate, and directed that the three craft elections be by Yes-No
ballot. 4 N.L.R.B. No. 35a (Dec. 15, 1937). In each case the craft union won and was certified. Id. No.
35b (Jan. 14, 1938).
O4 N.L.R.B. No. 58 (1937). Another phase of this case has been discussed, note 75, supra.
'If, after the United's withdrawal from the craft unit election, note 86, supra, the craft union had
not won, it is not clear how the Board would have handled the unit question. But it did win. 4 N.L.R.B.
No. 58b (1938). See also Pacific Greyhound Lines, quoted at note 99, infra.
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But because of the absence of any such history of craft bargaining before the
coming of the CIO, Mr. Smith again dissented in Worthington Pump Corporation.7
Here no election was directed because the evidence obtained at the hearing showed a
majority preference for the Pattern Makers Association (AFL) on the part of the
unit, found by the other two Board members to be appropriate, consisting of wood
pattern makers and their apprentices. There was no petition for a determination as
to the rest of the employees, for the respondent had already made a contract with
the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, recognizing its authority to represent all
employees, but containing the proviso: "It is understood that the wood pattern
makers are excluded from this agreement pending the settlement of their status by
the NLRB."
In Pacific Greyhound Lines9" Mr. Smith again dissented, this time favoring the
smaller unit (bus drivers) because the union desiring the larger unit had been "the
recipient of the Company's illegal favors."' 9 But the other members decided other-
wise and gave the bus drivers the usual option of deciding which union they pre-
ferred and said that "upon the results of this election will depend in part the de-
termination of the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. If the
bus drivers choose the Brotherhood, bus drivers alone will constitute an appropriate
unit; if they choose the Amalgamated, they will have expressed their preference for
a single larger unit consisting of all the employees."
C. The Significance of Union Membership Rules
Since collective bargaining is necessarily, or at least customarily, carried on
through unions, the Board has from the beginning almost invariably decided that
employees shall not be included in a unit unless they are eligible to the union desig-
nated as the representative of the unit (or, where there is an election, to every union
that is a candidate) .100 Thus a union by its membership rules often affects the defini-
tion of units. Rules of the union limiting its membership also limit the membership
of the unit it seeks to represent, for, as the Board has said, "the rules of eligibility to
membership in the union which the employees form or join constitute one of the
'14 N.L.R.B. No. 61 (1937).
us4 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1937). The passage quoted is at p. 8. Bus drivers were to be separate unit if
they so voted, according to Penna. Greyhound Lines, 3 id. No. 69, pp. 14, 25, 29, 38, 41, 44, 46, 48, 50
(1937).
'Where the situation was reversed, that is, where the union contending for the plant-inclusive unit
had been favored by the employer, Mr. Smith concurred, for this reason, with his colleagues in setting up
the smaller unit desired by the other candidate. Zenite Metal Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 73 (1938). But he
continues to adhere to the view he took in the Allis-Chalmers and similar cases and dissented accordingly
in Armour & Co., id. No. 75 (1938).
"
5 5 International Mercantile Marine Co., i N.L.R.B. 384 (1936); International Filter Co., i N.L.R.B.
489. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 2 id. 18S (1936). Contrary decisions in Grace Line, Inc., id. 369, 374 (1936),
and N. Y. and Cuba Mail S. S. Co., id. 595, 598 (1937), were reversed upon reconsideration, id. at 382(1937) and 6o5 (1937), the Board thus reverting to the classification it had made in the I.M.M. case,
supra. Another contrary decision is Richardson Co., 4 id. No. 94 (1938), where, though one of the unions
excluded maintenance employees, the Board included them with production employees. Thereupon a
majority of the employees in the unit voted against both unions. 5 id. No. 43 (1938). A policy of not
organizing certain employees is sometimes given the same effect as a membership rule. Red River Lumber
Co., id. No. 9o, p. 9, n. 9 (1938).
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clearest manifestations of the manner in which they desire collective bargaining to
take place."''1
This requirement that the unit be no larger than the membership reach of the
union that wishes to represent the unit operates as a limitation on both the vertical
and the horizontal classification of employees, excluding, for example, from craft
units noncraftsmen that are excluded from one or more of the unions seeking to
represent the unit; from units of production employees clerks when any of the
candidate unions excludes clerks; and supervisory employees from units composed
of the men they oversee when the union which wishes to represent the men they
oversee will not admit them also. In vertical classification, particularly when there
is a struggle between craft unions and industrial unions, the larger group usually
wants to swallow the smaller group. But in horizontal classification, the larger group
usually rejects the smaller; that is, the foremen or the watchmen or the office staff
ordinarily are not the ones who object to being part of the mass unit (or at least
would be willing to be included if they might belong to the union also). It is the
mass of employees that prefer to be apart from their more employer-minded com-
rades, as is shown by the union membership qualifications. "Home rule" is not a
question of the size of the group: it is mostly a question of union rules.
This principle is illustrated by a series of cases concerning employment at sea.
The petitioner in Grace Line, Inc., ° °2 was a local of the National Marine Engineers'
Beneficial Association (MEBA), then belonging to the Brotherhood of Railway
Locomotive Engineers, with a membership limited to marine engineers, licensed by
the United States. The unaffiliated United Licensed Officers, consisting of licensed
marine engineers and licensed deck officers, and the International Union of Operating
Engineers, an AFL affiliate, admitting both licensed and unlicensed marine engi-
neers, were also parties. The Board formed a unit consisting of the marine en-
gineers, whether or not licensed (there being few unlicensed engineers), and put all
three organizations on the ballot. The two unions not accepting unlicensed per-
sonnel obtained no satisfaction on a rehearing; and the election was held. 10 3 But
when, before the results of the balloting had been announced, the International Sea-
men's Union, another AFL affiliate, petitioned for a determination of representation
of unlicensed personnel, the Board decided that unlicensed engineers should be in-
cluded in that unit.104 The ballots of the unlicensed engineers in the previous elec-
tions not having been segregated and the elections having been close, the Board
thereupon ordered in the Grace Line case new elections for licensed personnel
"I SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (x937) 129; U. S. Testing Co., Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1938). Though
no case has altered boundaries once established, several intimate that changes in union membership would
be good ground for redefinition of units. See M. H. Birge & Sons Co., id. No. 51 (1938); R. C. A. Com-
munications, Inc., supra note 8o; News Syndicate Co., Inc., supra note 56(3); Great Lakes Engineering
Works, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 85 (1937); Daily Mirror, Inc., 5 id. No. 59, P. 7 (1938).
3032 N.L.R.B. 369 (1936-7). N. Y. and Cuba Mail S. S. Co., id. 595 (1937), is a closely parallel
case, in which the United Licensed Officers petitioned for a determination of representation of both licensed
deck officers and licensed marine engineers. " 2 N.L.R.B., at 380.
"' American France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (1937). The case covers the Grace Line and many others.
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only.' 0 5 So many elections 0 6 have now been held on steamships with the personnel
thus divided into one or more units of licensed, and one or more of unlicensed,
personnel'0 7 that this unit boundaryis a fixed frontier in labor relati6ns.
D. Other Bases of Classification
Employees who represent peculiarly the interest of the employer or whose higher
wages or stated periodic salary or other conditions of work (office clerks, draftsmen,
laboratory workers) dissociate them from the rest of the workers are ordinarily not
desired, as we have seen, in a union predominantly of production employees. Such a
separation of supervisors and clerks from other workers is therefore made by the
Board as a matter of course.108 But in cases where they are eligible to membership
in the union (or every union) that may be chosen as representative, and where
neither their own group nor the less employer-minded worker 'group shows a desire
to be separate, the Board has several times allowed their inclusion. 10 9 With the ex-
ception of this line 10 and that between licensed and unlicensed personnel on ships,
the Board has not drawn what may be called horizontal lines between bargaining
units. 1 '
'2 N.L.R.B., at 383. The MEBA (which meanwhile had joined the CIO) received a majority of all
ballots and was certified. 4 id. No. go (1938).1
' There have been over fifty elections conducted in carrying out this decision and those named in notes
104, supra, and 107, infra. Such elections, because of the movement of the ships, present special problems
to be discussed later.
'Radio operators comprise a unit; so do licensed deck officers. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 5o2,
io6-8 (936). The former were so recognized also in Southgate-Nelson Corp., 4 id. No. 44 (1937),
and in Clyde-Mallory Lines, Inc., 5 id. No. 72 (1938). And the latter in Amcrican-Hawaiian S. S. Co.,
2 id. 424 (936). Deck officers and electrical engineers were excluded from the unit of licensed marine
engineers in International Mercantile Marine Co., i id. 384, 388-390. Presumably electrical engineers form
a unit. Cf. American France Line, 3 id. 'o. 7 P. 7. Licensed marine engineers, to the exclusion of un-
licensed, were recognized as a bargaining unit in the Lykes and I.M.M. cases, supra, and in Black
Diamond S. S. Co., 2 id. 241, 244 (1936); Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd., 2 id. 282, 286 (1936); and Panama
R. R. Co., 2 id. 290, 294 (1936), before the Board tried combining licensed and unlicensed marine engi-
neers in Grace Line, Inc., and N. Y. & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., both supra note xo2. Before reverting (Sept.
8, X937) to its earlier segregation of licensed engineers, it had drawn that line in several new cases.
Ocean S. S. Co. of Savannah, 2 id. 588 (1937); Merchants & Miners Transportation Co., 2 id. 747 (1937)
(unless permanently employed in positions where a license is unnecessary). And more recently it has drawn
the same unit boundary in tugboat employment. Curtis Bay Towing Co., 4 id. No. 53, p. 8 (x937).
Under General Petroleum Corp. of Cal., 5 id. No. 129 (938), unlicensed personnel of the engine depart-
ments forms a unit; so does unlicensed personnel of the stewards' departments.
" Richardson Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (938) (foremen, other supervisory employees, clerical em-
ployees, and watchmen excluded); Ontario Knife Co., 4 id., No. 4 (x937) (same); Huth & James Shoe Mfg.
Co., 3 id. No. 20 (1937) (clerks excluded though unions willing to leave them in); Alabamt Drydock
Co., 5 id. No. 25 (1938) (same, though one union wished to leave them in); Atlantic Basin Iron Works,
5 id. No. 65 (937) (office and clerical employees, timekeepers, and draftsmen excluded).
"Luckenbach S. S. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 181, 187 (1936) (watchmen); J. G. McDonald Chocolate
Co., 5 id. No. 77 (1938) (same); Sweet Candy CO., 5 id. No. 76 (1938) (same); Goldstein Hat Mfg. Co.,
4 id. No. 13a (x937) (foremen); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 id. No. 24b (1937) (clerks in production
dept.). Compare Michaels Bros. (N. Y. LRB, Oct. 17, 1937) (no separation of furniture store clerks
from other employees, though one union so requested).
"'1Of the countless recent cases, American Sugar Refining Co., quoted at note 1s5, inira is typical.
See also Hubinger Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 31, p. 6 (x937); Fedders Mfg. Co., Inc., 3 id. No. 86 (1937);
Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 5 id. No. 31 (1938).
"In International Mercantile Marine Co., i N.L.R.B. 384, 388 (1936), the company's plea for
separate units for chief engineers, assistant engineers, and junior engineers was rejected, but one reason for
separating engineers from deck officers was that "the chief engineer is subordinate to and takes orders from
the master."
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In one case a line was drawn between production employees and maintenance
employees, where there was an employee demand for such segregation.." 2 Likewise
occasional employees are sometimes separated, probably pursuant to the desire of the
regular employees."13 There has been no separation and no demand for'separation
on race or sex or nationality lines. What would the Board do if a union having such
a limitation of membership" 4 should ask the Board to set up a unit containing some
of the excluded class?
In sum, unit lines are drawn: (i) where there is substantial geographical separa-
tion and an employee desire for bargaining separation; (2) where there is craft or
some other functional difference and an employee desire for bargaining separation;
(3) to prevent employees from being represented by a union which they can not
join. Other criteria are often mentioned (wages, skill, organization of business, his-
tory of labor relations in the industry or in the plant, close connection with interests
of employer, authority to hire and fire, etc.). They are tests of functional difference,
of employees' desire, or of both; frequently they merely emphasize a line that is also
fixed by the union's (or unions') own rules of membership.
A substantial quotation from a recent case"15 will show the Board's present atti-
tude; how it decides many exclusion questions without actual evidence of the wishes
of the employees and without precise interpretation of union membership rules,
but in accordance with the Board's understanding of the probable wishes of the em-
ployees. This case was initiated by two petitions, one from the CIO and the other
from the AFL United Sugar Workers Union, Local 21023, referred to as the Federal
Union, each asking for a determination "concerning the representation of employees
of American Sugar Refining Co." The International Longshoremen's Association
intervened but did not ask for a certification of representatives as the other unions
did.
'Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 24 (1937) (maintenance electricians, at desire of craft
union to which most of them belonged, separated from production electricians; but forge shop engineers,
with assent of craft union to which most of them belonged, not separated from main power house engi-
neers). In Schick Dry Shaver Co., 4 id. No. 35 (11937), and Waterbury Mfg. Co., 5 id. No. 42 (938), the
unit comprised highly skilled maintenance workers and a few highly skilled production workers. Contra:
Richardson Co., supra note ioo; International Harvester Co., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1938); News Syndicate
Co., Inc., 4 id. No. i9 (1938). In- horizontal exclusions the Board apparently does not care whether
there is another organization likely to organize the excluded employees; but in vertical exclusions this
appears to be a factor, though the Board does not expressly say so. Thus in American Sugar Refining
Co., quoted at note 115, infra, though several "higher up" groups were excluded without consideration
of their opportunity for collective bargaining, there was only one vertically excluded group, longshoremen,
almost half of whom had joined the International Longshoremen's Union. So existence of suitable unions
for excluded employees is a consideration in I.M.M., supra note iii, and in Daily Mirror, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B.
No. 59, P. 9 (1938).
"Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. No. io9 (938) (Saturday extra help excluded); Bishop
& Co., 4 id. No. 71 (1937) (seasonal help excluded, as desired by sole union). Contra: Richards-Wilcox
Mfg. Co., 2 id. 97 (936) (temporary employees included contrary to desire of sole union).
"' Such as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen (excluding Mexicans, Negroes
and Indians). Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 72, P. 4 (1938). By definition of the
Pa. LRA §3 (f) this would be no "labor organization." See (1937) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 79, and
Negroes and the Labor Relations Acts (i937) 6 I. J. A. MONTHLY BULL. 46.
'American Sugar Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. io8 (938). The passage quoted is from pp. 3-6.
The Board's discussion of the checkers, samplers, and chauffeurs is omitted. It included each of these
groups in the unit. For result of the election, see 5 id. No. 45 (1938).
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"The Federal Union maintains that all employees of the Company at its Baltimore,
Maryland, refinery, exclusive of executives, supervisory and office workers, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining. The C. I. 0. contends that there
should be excluded from the unit supervisory and clerical employees, longshoremen,
weighers, checkers, samplers, guards, chauffeurs, and laboratory workers ...
Longshoremen. Testimony offered by the Company indicates that it employed 67 long-
shoremen during the week of October i6, 1937. The Federal Union contends that the
longshoremen of the Company should be included within the bargaining unit since they
work as production workers in the raw sugar sheds of the Company when not engaged as
longshoremen. However, since April 1937, at which time the I. L. A. began to organize
the Company's longshoremen, the practice of working in the refinery when longshoremen's
work was not available has diminished considerably. At the time of the hearing, an aver-
age of only six longshoremen per day worked in the raw sugar sheds. The Federal Union
also stated that the longshoremen employed by a sugar refinery in Boston had participated
with production employees in an election held to choose representatives for the purposes
of collective bargaining.
Other considerations persuade us to the view, however, that the longshoremen should
not be included in the same bargaining unit with the production employees of the Com-
pany. The longshoremen- of the Company are eligible to membership in the I. L. A. and
almost 50 per cent of them are members of the I. L. A. The president of the Federal
Union testified that at the time of the hearing no longshoremen were members of the
Federal Union. The Company pays the longshoremen $i.o5 per hour, which is the I. L. A.
scale for longshoremen in the Baltimore area, whereas the production workers of the
Company are paid only 50 or 55 cents per hour.
Upon the basis of all the evidence, we find that the longshoremen should not be
included in the unit.
Weighers. The C. I. 0. contends that the two weighers employed by the Company are
part of the clerical force and as such should be excluded from the bargaining unit. Such
employees are paid weekly wages, whereas the production employees are paid on an hourly
basis. The weighers check the results obtained by public weighers or seller's representatives
who weigh the raw sugar when a cargo arrives at the docks of the Company. In addition
to checking the weights, they record them as well. When there is no ship cargo which
requires weighing and checking, the weighers perform other duties such as running electric
trucks on the dock, and taking slings of sugar from storage to the place where the sugar
bags are cut and emptied for refining purposes. On occasion, they also do some check
weighing of refined sugar.
We feel that, under all the circumstances, the duties and interests of the weighers are
closely related to those of the production workers, and that the weighers should be included
in the bargaining unit ...
Guards. The Company employs seven uniformed men who are charged with the duty
of protecting its property. It is evident that these employees are closely associated with man-
agement and that their interests differ materially from those of the production employees.
In accordance with our decisions in other cases, we find that the guards should be excluded
from the unit. . 116
Laboratory workers. . . .One worker keeps the laboratory records; the other three
are routine analysts who make tests during the various stages in the production of refined
sugar. The three employees also at times make other tests incidental to the operation of
the refinery. All four employees are paid on a weekly salary basis. In so far as possible,
"
0See R. C. A. Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 159 (1936). And see 2so Bendix Products Corp., 3 id. No.
68 (1937). [Note by NLRB]
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the Company fills vacancies in the laboratory by promoting refinery employees who possess
a high school education. We find that the qualifications and activities of the laboratory
workers differ essentially from those of the other workers whom we have included in the
unit, and such employees should not be included within the bargaining unit.117
We find that the production employees of the Company, including weighers, checkers,
samplers, and chauffeurs, but excluding longshoremen, guards, laboratory workers, and
supervisory and clerical employees, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining ..
6. THE CHOICE OF REPRESENTATIVES
A. Candidates
"The term representativ.es includes any individual or labor organization. ' 1 18 This
definition was put in the Act to assure that a labor organization could be the repre-
sentative of employees. For in proceedings before the NIRA labor boards it had
been repeatedly, but unsuccessfully,'" argued that only fellow employees could be
representatives. At that time the argument that "representative" meant natural per-
son could find some support in the Railway Labor Act,120 which is so important a
precedent in interpreting later labor relations legislation.' 21 Moreover the Automo-
bile Labor Board, in attempting to set up collective bargaining on the basis of com-
mittees, on which different "districts" of employees were represented by individuals,
was giving "representative" the exclusive meaning of human being.
122
But experience under the NLRA shows that while individuals may be chosen,
123
none ever is. The only real question now is: what organizations are eligible? The
New York 124 and Wisconsin' 2 5 statutes expressly exclude "company unions," but
there is no express restriction in the NLRA.
The Board has now been unanimously sustained by highest authority in requiring
employers to "disestablish," as representatives of their employees, unions which they
"See Southern Chemical Cotton Co., 3 N.L.R.B. No. go (1937). [Note by NLRB]
115NLRA §2(4).
'Berkeley Woolen Mills, i N.L.B. 5 (1933); Hall B;aking Co., i id. 83 (1934). But see note 122,
inira.
fraSupra note 2, §2, Third, 45 U. S. C. (934) §152, Third: "Representatives for the purposes of
this act, shall be designated by the respective parties * in such manner as shall be provided for in their
corporate organization or unincorporated association." The words following the asterisk were omitted
when the Act was amended in 1934 and the following sentence added in which, as in the rest of the
Act, the word representative is used to mean not the natural person who negotiates but the legal entity
that is engaged in making the contract: "Representatives of employees for the purpose of this act need
not be persons in the employ of the carrier, and no carrier shall ... prevent the designation by its em-
ployees as their representatives of those vho or which are not employees of the carrier." U. S. C. A. (1937
Supp.) §152, Third. (Italics added)
1 Note, for instance, the strong reliance on the Railway Labor Act and decisions thereunder in NLRB
v. Penna. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 58 Sup. Ct. 571 (1938).
' LoRwss AND WVuaNIG, op. cit. supra note Ii, at 372-377.
The Wisconsin LRA, § 111.00(3), prohibits the appearance of any company unioncor oDlcer thereof
upon any ballot.
'By the implication, that a representative may be only a labor organization or an individual, §701.4,
and by defining "labor organization" to exclude a company union, §701.5, as defined therein, §70i.6.
'Supra note 123. Though the exclusion is from the ballot, it surely means that no company union
may be certified by the Board. "Company union" in both statutes means, briefly, a union dominated,
through fear or favor, by the employer.
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influence or control in violation of NLRA, Section 8(2).126 In a situation where the
Board would forbid the employer to bargain with such a union, it will not, of course,
recognize the candidacy of such a union for bargaining representative. In S. Blech-
man & Sons, Inc.,12 7 the Board both set aside the tally of a consent election which
the employer-dominated union had won, and denied it inscription on the ballot to
be used in the new election which the Board ordered. In no case has an organization
been excluded from candidacy without a finding in a complaint case of unfair labor
practices by which it was favored or controlled by the employer,' 28 though it is hard
to believe that the powers of the Board are not sufficient to exclude it without such
a proceeding. Under the present rule a union might be certified in a representation
proceeding and then be "disestablished" immediately afterwards in an unfair labor
practice proceeding. Proceedings like the Blechman matter, under both section 9
and section io, are few.
In Swayne and Hoyt, Ltd., ' 29 after balloting was in progress, the petitioner filed
charges against the employer of employer-support of a rival union. The petitioner
was for this reason granted leave to withdraw its petition for a determination of
representation. In Lenox Shoe Co., Inc.,'30 the Board, considering both a complaint
and a representation petition, found conduct within Section 8(i) and (3) but none
within Section 8(2), perhaps because the employer-favored union in this case was
nationally affiliated, and announced the holding of an election, in which this union
might participate as a candidate.i 3°o But it postponed the election "until such time
as the Board is satisfied that there has been substantial compliance with its order to
dissipate the effects of the unfair labor practices of the respondent and to permit an
election uninfluenced by the respondent's conduct." There has been postponement in
other cases also.131
'INLRB v. Penna. Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra note 121; NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
58 Sup. Ct. 577 (1938). In both cases the part of the Board's order to this effect was set aside by the
lower court, 91 F. (2d) 178 (3d, 1937); 91 F. (2d) 458 (gth, 1937). Before it was restored by the
Supreme Court, the Board directed an election and, probably in deference to the C. C. A., allowed the
employer-favored union a place on the ballot. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (1937).
" 4 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1937). Accord: Industrial Rayon Corp., 3 id. No. 2 (x937); New Idea, Inc., 5
id. No. 62 (1938). In The Greer Steel Co., 4 id. No. 50 (1937), the employer-dominated union was
excluded from the ballot by stipulation of the respondent.
mSee note 16, supra. In its SEcosN ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 113, the Board, citing cases, says that
it has directed that the kept union be given a place on the ballot, unless, upon a charge of violation of
§8(2), the Board has sustained the complaint. When it found in a representation case that "the Asso-
ciation is dominated and controlled by the Company," it let it go on the ballot. Dwight Mfg. Co., i id.
309, 313 (1936). But in American France Line, 3 id. No. 45 (937), the Board says one organization
may show that another is "not entitled to a place on the ballot" because it exists in violation of NLRA
§8(2).
W'2 N.L.R.B. 282, 289 (1937). Compare E. S. McNary, Inc., Pa. LRB, Dec. 23, 1937 (Board "loath
to certify" employer-dominated petitioner and does not because employer is bargaining with it; reason
for not setting bounds of unit, as requested, not explained).
no 4 N.L.R.B. No. 54, P. 18 (1937). See notes 62 and 63, supra.
' Compare National Electric Products Corp., 3 N.L.R.B. No. 47 (1937) (election was not postponed
despite unfair labor practices) and Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 1o (1937) (no
petition for determination of representation), aff'd, Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 2 LABOR REL. REP.
97 (C. C. A., 2d, March 14, 1938). In both these cases the Board found conduct within §8(1) and (3)
but none within §8(2) and accordingly did not order the "disestablishment" of a nationally affiliated
union.
"Todd Shipyards Corp., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 9, p. 6 (r938). Cf. Pacific Greyhound case, .upra note 126.
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B. Determination of Choice Without Balloting
The Board in making its determinations of representatives acts upon evidence.
If evidence produced at the hearing is adequate to enable the Board to reach a de-
cision, it will not order an el&tion, for an election is just a means whereby it may get
more accurate evidence on which to base its determination.
The question of unit has, until recently, always been decided without an election.
Now the unit decision, as we have seen, is sometimes made dependent on the out-
come of balloting for representative.
Ordinarily the unit question must first be settled, and, when it is, in a large pro-
portion of cases, a disposition can be made without resorting to an election.' 3 2 Thus
the Board will dismiss the case on the ground that there is "no question concerning
representation" if the employer is already in proper bargaining relations with the
union that the majority clearly desires.'13 Or it might dismiss a case, though ap-
parently it never has dismissed one without an election,' 3 4 if it appears that the
majority does not wish to bargain collectively at all.
But more usually the evidence' 35 adduced at the hearing will enable the Board
to certify the petitioner (or sometimes an intervening union). Where there is only
one union, the admission of the employer that it is the choice of the majority in the
unit that the Board defines, has been taken as sufficient evidence that such is the
fact.'33 So has testimony of union records or officers when not contested. 1 37 More
trustworthy are union membership application cards, petitions to the Board, or
notices to the employer, signed individually by a majority of the employees in the
unit. s3 8 But they must be of fairly recent date, signed voluntarily, and otherwise
'Unit questions are sometimes left to settlement after the election, the votes of the employees in the
contested area being segregated. International Mercantile Marine Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 971, 975 (1937); Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 5 id. No. 26, P. 4 (1938).
" The cases are of three types. () Petition dismissed because petitioner is recognized by the employer
as bargaining representative of the employees: Williams Dimond & Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 859, 867 (1937);
Pacific S. S. Co., 2 id. 214, 230 (1936) (E. S. Smith, doubting); M. H. Birge & Sons Co., 5 id. No. 51
(1936) (after refusal to enlarge bargaining unit as requested by petitioner); E. S. McNary, Inc., supra note
129. (2) Petition dismissed because another union is properly so recognized. Todd Seattle Dry Docks,
Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1070 (937); The National Sugar Refining Co. of.N. J., 4 id. No. 32 (937). Freeman
Shoe Corp., Wis. LRB, Oct. 23, 1937. (3) Petition. dismissed because the employer is being required by
an order of the Board in an unfair labor practice proceeding to bargain with the representative entitled
to recognition. Omaha Hat Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. No. io6, p. 15 (938); The Triplett Electrical Instrument
Co., 5 id. No. 112, p. 23 (1938). a'See notes 171 and 183, infra.
" In proceedings before the Board "the rules of evidence prevailing in. courts of law or equity shall
not be controlling." NLRB Rules, art. II, §26. "The aim is to obtain the facts in as direct and simple a
manner as possible." Wis. LRB Rules, art. II, §14.
'Duplex Printing Press Co., x N.L.R.B. 82 (1935); Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., Inc., 2 id. 759
(1937); Lunkenheimer Co., 4 id. No. 131 (1938).
" Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 97 (1936); Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 2 id. 102 (1936); Vicks-
burg Garment Co., 5 id. No. 46 (1938); National Sewing Machine Co.:5 id. No. 6o (1938). The Board
does not require disclosure of union membership, however. Samson Tire & Rubber Corp., 2 id. 148
(1936). Sometimes it does not rely on this evidence. Beaumont Mfg. Co., 5 id. No. 14 (1938); Sweet
Candy Co., 5 id. No. 76 (1938).
"aSee NLRB, SEcOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 108-i09; Los Angeles Broadcasting Co., Inc., 4
N.L.R.B. No. 6o (1937); Wadsworth Watch Case Co., 4 id. No. 67 (1937); McKell Coal Co., Inc., 4 id.
No. 70 (1937); News Syndicate Co., Inc., 4 id. No. izg (1938); Penna. Shipyards, Inc., 5 id. No. 8
(1938); Hood Rubber Co., 5 id. No. 27 (1938). That an applicant for membership has made no payment
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unequivocal.' 39 Even more convincing is the testimony of individual employees at
the hearing. If more than half state that they wish to be represented by a particular
union, the Board will cerdfy., 40
C. Determination by Balloting
Where the testimony at the hearing does not indicate with sufficient certainty
whom the majority desires as representative, the Board directs an election.14 This
is mentioned in the Act as a "suitable method to ascertain such representatives"1 42
and is now used, as we have seen,' 43 to determine units also. With a modification
of the voting list to conform as nearly as may be to the employment situation at the
critical date, an election might conceivably serve to throw light on the legitimacy of
labor practices at some date in the past.' 44
i. Nomination. The candidates that may appear on the ballots are only the
unions that have participated in the hearing. Though there is no such statutory
limitation, for practical reasons the Board does not present to the voters a union that
does not take part in the preliminaries. 145 But there is no rule that a union must
appear under any particular name. Thus where the Board was faced by two AFL
craft unions and a CIO union as candidates in the proposed Shower Bros. Furniture
Co. election, it directed (to avoid settling a contest internal to the AFL) that the
ballot should' offer the choice between the "AFL," the United Furniture Workers
does not lessen the credibility of this evidence. Clifford M. DiKay, 2 id. 231, 237 (1936). Zenite Metal
Corp., 5 id. No. 73 (938). But if an employee has applied for membership in more than one union, the
applications will be disregarded. A. Zerega's Sons, Inc., 5 id. No. 7r (938). Clyde-Mallory Lines, id. No.
72 (1938).
I"NLRB, SECOND A.iNumt L REPORT (1937) io9-zro; N. Y. Mail & Newspaper Transportation Co., 4
N.L.R.B. No. 118 (1938).
"'Wilmington Transportation Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 132, p. 4 (1938).
uFrequently the Board superintends "consent" elections, conducted according to agreement of the
employer and the candidate union or unions. Where possible, "the parties determined the proper bargain-
ing unit, the form of the ballot, the polling .place, the time of election, the eligibility list, the method of
tallying, and other similar details." NLRB, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 29. These consent elections
(23 in X935-6; 217 in 1936-7) are not preceded by the petition and hearing preliminary to directed elec-
tions (8 in 1935-6; 48 in 1936-7). Nor are they followed by any action by the Board, such as certification.
If during a hearing on a petition the parties reach a settlement, the stipulation sometimes calls for an elec-
tion, which is then directed by the Board to be conducted according to the terms of the stipulation. The
Board then certifies the winner. Recent examples are The Greer Steel Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 5o (1937);
Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 5 id. No. 32 (1938).
54 3NLRA §9(c). 1"3 Note 65, supra.
.. For example, bargaining between a union and the employer has statutory status (is the employer's
duty) if the union was at that time majority representative. Both the lawfulness of a resulting contract
purporting to cover all employees, particularly the lawfulness of a closed shop agreement, and, conversely,
the lawfulness of an employer's refusal to bargain, depend on a fact that it is now difficult to ascertain.
As it happens, the voting list in the election to choose a reprqentative presently is apt to be of that
earlier date, for the contract objected to or the refusal to bargain will ordinarily at once lead either
to a strike or to a petition to the Board, and the Board's usual rule is to take the payroll next preceding
the strike or the filing of the petition as the voting list in the election. See notes 70 supra, and 15o,
inira. See, e.g., National Electric Products Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 47 (x937) supra note 57 (payroll of May 21;
closed shop agreement of May 27).
" N. Y. & Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 595, 6o2 (1937); Penna. Greyhound Lines, 4 id. No. 69,
p. 27-8 (1937). Cf. Grace Line, Inc., 2 id. 369, 376 (1936) (refusal to allow space on ballot for writing
name of desired representative in).
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(CIO), or neither.146 But when one of the AFL unions protested against this no-
menclature, the Board changed'the ballot designation from "AFL" to "Upholsterers,"
that being the AFL union with the larger membership and both unions having
agreed that the name.of only one or the other of them should go on the ballot.1 47 In
many cases unions are designated by informal or general names. 14s In view of the
Board's policy of not settling controversies between unions that are parts of the same
labor federation, 14 the responsibility is upon the parent to give proper effect to any
certification made by improper name. But it may sometimes be difficult for the
Board in a contest of which it can not completely wash its hands because others than
unions in the same federation are involved, to know what name to use when the
two co-federationists disagree.
2. Voters. Preliminary to the voting, the Board must determine not only the
form of the ballot, but the correct list of voters. Not every person in the bargaining
unit may vote; often all employees that have been taken on since the petition was
filed or since the start of the strike which precipitated the filing of the petition are
excluded by directing that the employer's payroll next preceding that event be used
as the list of voters. 150 A payroll of later date is selected if the parties or, perhaps,
the candidates so agree; sometimes in other cases. It'is only persons on the designated
roll who are still working for the employer or who otherwise qualify as present
employees, that may vote.' 51 Finally in maritime elections the Board has a special
formula: the voter qualifies only if (i) he has been employed at some time between
the filing date of the initiating petition and the announcement of the Board's direc-
tion of election,' 52 and (2) he is employed on the particular voyage during which
the poll is taken.a53 The rules, or rather the Board's flexible practices, concerning
"Showers Bros. Furniture Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 77 (I937).
'.Id., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 77b (1937). But the Board warned that it would settle no AFL jurisdictional
disputes. There was a change of name also in Walker Vehicle Co., 4 id. No. 34b (i937).
"'Penna. Shipyards, Inc., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1938) ("Local Metal Trades Council," certified without
election); Alabama Drydock & Shipbuilding Co., id. No. 25 (1938) ("Local Metal Trades Council," on
ballot); International Harvester Co. Tractor Works, 5 N.L.R.B. No. 30(a) (1928) (minor changes to
make names those by which "these organizations are commonly known to the employees"); Correct Print-
ing Co. (N. Y. LRB, Nov. 15, 1937) ("unions affiliated with Allied Printing Trades Council," on ballot).
..See p. 194, supra.
"The definition of employee in NLRA §2(3) requires that strikers and persons discharged because
of unfair labor practices should be allowed to vote. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., i N.L.R.B.
1S (1936). Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., Inc., 2 id., 759, 764 (1937). Persons hired in their place are
expressly excluded by the Wisconsin Act, §nii.02(3), and persons "employed only for the duration of a
labor dispute" by the New York Act, §701.3 and §705.4.
" Persons who voluntarily quit or are discharged for cause do not vote. The direction of election often
so states. Strain Mfg. Co., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1938). Employees temporarily laid off vote. Fedders
Mfg. Co., 3 id. No. 86, p. 6 (1937), 5 id. No. 41 (938). If the discharge is more permanent, they do
not. Armour & Co., 4 id. No. 115, p. 5 (938); N. Y. Handkerchief Co., 5 id. No. 94, P. 3 (1938).
Compare Brotherhood v. Kenan, 87 F. (2d) 65r, 654 (Sth, 1937).
2a Owing to a tie-up of many vessels, an arbitrary period of eighteen months was allowed in Merchants
& Miners Transportation Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 747, 751-3 (1937). See also Alabama Drydock & Shipbuilding
CO., 5 id. No. 25 (1938) (four months' period fixed because single job contract basis of company's business
caused constant fluctuation in the number of employees actually working).
" The election notice is usually posted on the ship at the start of the voyage and the election held
either at a port of call or at the port of destination, wherever it can be conveniently supervised by the
Board. NLRB, SEcoND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 29 and 112. In any discontinuous employment the
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voting lists are fully described in its two annual reports,154 and have undergone very
little modification since July 1, 1937.15 5
3. Conduct and Effect of Balloting. Unless the Board permits voting by mail, =60
the voter must personally cast his ballot at the time and place either designated by
the Board in its direction of election or, more usually, left to later designation by the
appropriate regional director in charge of the election. Ordinarily all persons vote
at the same place, usually but not always off the employer's premises, 6 7 and on the
same day, according to general instructions.'6 8 But variations in both respects are
made depending on circumstances. Most noteworthy is the variant that is used in
ship elections. The crews of all the ships of a single corporation are part of the
same bargaining units, but each ship is, necessarily, a separate electoral unit and its
crew has to be polled at some time and place which is convenient both for the voters,
the employer, and the Board. Accordingly such elections often extend over many
months and are held in many ports of the United Statet, as the several ships call
there.159 Because of the time needed to carry out an election of this kind, election
arrangements are most elaborate in these cases, and often need to be modified as the
voting proceeds.160 Thus the Board requires equal treatment of rivals in the issuance
by employers of passes to organizers.161 In one case, where sailings were interrupted
by a strike, it ordered that the ballots be counted before the vote had been taken on
4 of the 58 ships of the employer, on the chance that the ballots already cast would
be completely determinative.162 Just as the Board will act without passing on con-
tested ballots if they could not affect the result; so here it certified the union which
this intermediate count revealed to have received votes amounting to a majority of
all potential voters. 163
Any event impairing freedom of choice of the voters is of course a ground for
rejecting the tally as evidence of choice. Intimidation, bribery, or lack of secrecy will
determination of eligible voters is difficult. In maritime elections (or any in which each voter does not
have a certain polling place) the danger of double voting can not be overlooked. See Mrs. Herrick's
statement, infra note 159. Double voting is expressly forbidden in Associated Oil Co., 5 N.L.R.B. No.
rig, p. 8 (1938). On the other hand entitled persons Inay get no chance to vote, e.g., if the employee is
on ship A when ship B is polled and on ship B when ship A is polled. But this is much like a voter's
illness or absence on election day in the ordinary type of election.
"I NLRB, FiRs" ANNUAL REPORT (1936) io6; SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (937) 11O.
"A presumption in favor of the use of a pre-petition payroll seems to be growing stronger. Such a
roll was used in x2 out of 21 elections directed during January, 1938. Rolls of a later date were used in
the rest, in four cases by stipulation. See 4 N.L.R.B. Nos. 72b, 1o8, 115, x11, 21, 123, 134, 139, 141.
Use of a pre-petition roll was denied in Gen. Cigar'Co., Inc., 6 id. No. 13 (1938), a year having elapsed.
"'As it did in Pacific Greyhound Lines, 4 N.L.R.B. No 72, p. 20 (1937).
"'The N. Y. LRA, §705.4, prohibits elections on the employer's premises.
IaSupra notes 19 and 2o.
"The handling of the many elections directed by American France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (937),
is interestingly told by NLRB Regional Director Elinore Morehouse Herrick in her statement to the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Feb. 2, 1938, NLRB Release R-582.
"e'Lykes Bros. Shipping Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 102 (1936); Grace Line, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 369 (1936);
American France Line, 3 id. No. 7, P. 9 (1937) ("other questions may arise"), id. No. 7a & 7b (1937);
and Mrs. Herrick's Statement, supra note 159. See also Armour & Co., 5 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (1938), where
certification was based on the segregated ballots of a group of employees cast in an earlier plant-wide
consent election.
"~American France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. 7a, 7b (1937); Intern'l Freighting Co., 3 id. No. 7o, P. 7 (1937).
" Lykes Bros. Shipping Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 102, 112 (1936). "~Id. at 113.
THE DETERMINATION OF EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES 219
lead to refusal to recognize the evidential value of the ballots.10 4 The policing sup-
plied by the NLRB is so adequate that such occurrences are rare.
A majority of those voting is sufficient evidence of the preference of the majority
of the employees in the unit.' 65 The Board has never failed to certify when the
winning union has received at least 2o/ of the votes of those on the voters' list; and
seems increasingly inclined to certify however small the vote. 6" But the question is
one of decreasing importance. Interest in voting seems to be waxing and employer
opposition lessening. The Board reports that "more than 8o% of the eligible voters
cast ballots" in 1935-36, 167 "more than 9o%" in I936-37,168 in (directed and consent)
elections conducted by the Board.
4. Form of Ballot. It will be remembered that last August the Board embarked
on the new policy of holding elections to help it in delimiting units.' 69 That month
also saw another major innovation in election procedure, the introduction of the "or
by neither" choice on ballots bearing the names of two or more candidates.' 70
The form of ballot which the present Board inherited from the earlier 'National
Labor Board and National Labor Relations Board administering Section 7(a) of the
"' National Sugar Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (r937) (consent election upheld because electioneer-
ing, if any very near polling place, was only a "slight irregularity"); N. Y. and Cuba Mail S. S. Co., 2
id. 603, 604 (1937) (directed election; same); Penna. Greyhound Lines, 4 id. No. 37 (1937) (election
set aside because blank ballots, not marked as samples, were distributed and at least one voted, impairing
secrecy of voting); Mrs. Herrick's Statement, supra note 159; Horn & Hardart, N. Y. LRB, Sept. 3, 1937
(consent election upheld; various charges of electioneering insubstantial).
" "In the cases under §9(c) where the Board has certified without holding an election, it has re-
quired proof that a majority of those eligible had designated the organization which was certified."
NLRB, FioST ANNUAL REPORT (1936) io8. "Those eligible" apparently means "those who would be
allowed to vote," though it may mean, "those who are members of the unit," and thus include new em-
ployees; at least no voters' list is actually prepared in these cases. It is obvious that if less than this
majority is shown, an election should be held. In the election itself, the Board at first followed the same
rule. Ibid. But with the support of the courts it now certifies on the basis of a majority of votes cast.
See note 4, supra, and NLRB SECOND I, ,NUAL REPORT (1937) 114. It is not clear whether a consent
election is subject to the new rule or not. As the Board does not certify after a consent election, note 147,
supra, the question rarely arises. Compare National Sugar Refining Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 38 (1937) (new
rule applied without discussion), with Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 5 id. No. 31 (1938).
... Chrysler Corp., i N.L.R.B. 164 (1936), was decided while the Board still required "the majority
of those eligible." There about 18% of the employees entitled to vote voted; 17Y2% for the union.
Without overruling this case, the Board has in all later cases certified, even where less than half of those
qualified have voted. Thus in R. C. A. Mfg. Co., 2 id. 159, 168 (i 36), about 32 z% voted; 31% for the
union; in American-Hawaiian S. S. Co., id. 195, 196 (1936), about 34!/% voted; 31% for the union;
in Williams Dimond & Co., id. 867, 870 (937) (Hammond Shipping Co.) 33',6% (one man) voted;
in Charles Cushman Shoe Co., id. 1015, 1034 (1937), about 24% of the Cushman employees voted; all
for the union; and about 22% of the Somerset Shoe Co. employees voted; 21-/% for the union; and
between 25% and 30% in several other elections. In certifying the union in this last series of elections,
the only ones where the vote for the union fell below 30%, the Board 6aid that "the bitter opposition
to the union which has been expressed by the companies" must have caused many who favored the union
to abstain from voting. Moreover the rival union, which boycotted the election, should not be heard to
complain. Thus, though citing the R.C.A. certification and the Supreme Court decision in the Virginian
Railway case, supra note 4, the Board intimates that where the vote goes below 30%, it may accept
it as a basis for certification only when the employEr or a rival unitn has tried to interfere with the
election. Even here there must be a lower limit. Though finding the employer guilty of unfair labor
practices, the National Labor Board refused to certify when only 12 out of iooo employees voted. Fifth
Avenue Coach Co., 2 N.L.B. 8 (1934). .NLRB, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1936) 44.
eNLRB, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT (1937) 29. "°See note 65, supra.
'-"American France Line, 3 N.L.R.B. No. 45, p. 4 (Aug. 16, 1937): A reason for the rule was first
,upplied in Interlake Iron Corp., 4 id. No. 9d (Dec. 28, 1937), where the yule's implications were further
developed.
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NIRA, was one which offered, in the case of a single candidate, an opportunity to
vote for or against that candidate;' 1 ' but in the case of more than one candidate, an
opportunity to vote for any one candidate but none to vote against both or all can-
didates. -This was a proper form of ballot so long as a majority vote of those per-
mitted to vote was necessary for certification; for failing to vote or casting a blank
ballot was equivalent to a negative vote.' 7 2
But when the Board in July, i936173 changed its rule and began certifying on the
basis of a majority vote of those voting, abstention ceased to be effective as opposition
in an election where there were two or more candidates on the ballot. To such an
election the rule was first applied in the R. C. A. case.' 7 4 Though the Board there
discussed only the propriety of certifying despite the fact that less than 5o% voted,
the decision to certify was really more radical in that it was based on a minority
vote for a candidate which it was impossible for employees to vote against except by
voting for another candidate. In other words, employees had no means of saying "a
plague on both your houses" or of rejecting collective bargaining altogether. 1,
This situation continued till the Board in August, 1937 was confronted by a
fierce contest between AFL and CIO in maritime employment. Then the Board
must have known that those not voting for one or the other candidate could not be
presumed to acquiesce in the choice of the majority of those voting effectively.
Hence it added to the ballot the negative option.'1 6 But even in Interlake Iron Cor-
poration17 7 where the Board first explains its new practice, it seems not to appreciate
fully the significance of its innovation of July, 1936. For it speaks of the casting of a
blank ballot as a "rather ambiguous method of expression" of disapproval, whereas
actually it is now a wholly ineffective one, a mere "failure to vote by one qualified to
do SO.'1I77 1
The Board's provision of the negative option is the logical corollary of its refusal
to consider at all those who fail to vote or who cast invalid ballots.
1n If the majority is against the candida te(s), the Board of course dismisses the petition. The Greer
Steel Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 5oa (1938). After "majority" came to mean "majority of those voting," note 4,
supra, and before a negative option was provided on ballots listing two or more candidates, dismissal for
this reason, though possible if the ballot carried one or three candidates, was impossible if there were two.
This situation existed from July 1936 till August 1937.
' See International Mercantile Marine Co., i N.L.R.B. 384, 390 (1936).
"The Associated Press, z N.L.R.B. 686, 697 (July 3, 1936). In this election there was only one
candidate, but, as no advance notice of a change of rule was given, persons who abstained may have
thought they were expressing their opposition as effectively as if they had voted "No," which they could
do on the unipartite ballot used.
"' R.C.A: Mfg. Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 159 (Nov. 7, 7936). This decision was foreshadowed by the
secondary reason given for the certification in New England Transportation Co., i id. 130, 146 (July 24,
1936). -
im The suggestion of abstention or voting blank, made in International Mercantile Marine Co., supra
note 172, was no longer valid.
'American France Line, supra note, 170. Up to February, two out of the 36 polls conducted under
this direction of election had resulted in a "neither" majority. In three polls the AFL union, and in 31
the CIO union, got a majority. Hence there were no run-off elections. A little over 7% of the valid
votes in the 36 polls were against both unions. Mrs. Herrick's Statement, supra note 559.
'
71Supra note 17o, at p. 4.
1Th Accord (with dictum likewise as to improperly marked ballots) Ass'n of Clerical Employees v.
Brotherhood, 85 F. (2d) 152, 757 (7th, 1936).
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5. Run-off Election. Another problem now arises, that of the inconclusive elec-
tion. Such elections of course were quite possible before the negative option was
added. But where there is only one candidate, he either wins or loses; and where
there were two candidates, under the pre-i937 dispensation one of them necessarily
won if a sufficient vote was cast (otherwise there was a definitive failure to choose);
and though, where there were three candidates, a run-off election might have been
used,178 no case presented the occasion for such an election until the introduction of
the negative option created three-way splits in two-candidate elections also.
In the Interlake Iron case 17 9 both the candidates moved the Board to delete the
phrase "or by neither" in the direction of election. The Board refused because "a
free expression of the desires of the majority of the employees ... demands that the
ballot provide for a space in which employees may indicate that they do not desire
to be represented by either of the named organizations." At the same time the Board
indicated what it would do in the event of "none of the three preferences obtaining
a majority of the votes cast," to wit, "we will, upon the request of the labor organiza-
tion receiving the greater number of votes, promptly direct a run-off election in which
the ballot will allow employees the opportunity to vote for or against this organiza-
tion." Mr. Edwin S. Smith, while agreeing to the negative option, disagreed with
holding a second election. Instead, unless the negative votes amounted to a majority,
he would have the Board treat the negative (anti-collective bargaining) votes as
overcome by the positive (pro-collective bargaining) votes for the rival candidates
and count only the positive votes as valid to determine the bargaining agency, thus
obtaining the choice in a single election wherever a majority of the voters desired
collective bargaining.'8 0
The Board ordered the first run-off election on January io, 1938, in Fedders Mfg.
Co.' 8 ' It was held January 28. As in the first election the payroll of July ii, im-
mediately before the filing of the petition, was used. Thus the voters' list was over
six months old. This and Zellerbach Paper Co.' 8 2 seem to show that, though the
leader in the first election does not pick up votes in the second, enough disappointed
voters abstain to enable the leader to win. Perhaps if "neither" is the leader in the
first election, a run-off election would be futile;' 83 the hatchets of interunion rivalry
are not buried quickly.
IAnd must be under the New York Act, §705.5. See note x6(0), supra.
-Supra note 17o.
'In Walker Vehicle Co., 4 N.L.R.B. No. 34 (1937), the Board reiterated the Interlake Iron ruling,
and Mr. Smith, accepting the rule laid down by the majority, concurred.
W14 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1938). See also note iso, supra. The vote in the original election was: peti-
tioner 400; plant union 369; neither 41. The vote in the run-off election was: petitioner 369, against
petitioner 346. 5 id. No. 41 (1938). Petitioner thus received 49% of the first vote, 52% of the second.
'"24 N.L.R.B. No. 52 (1937) and 52a (1938). Here also the same voters' list was used in both elec-
tions. In the first election petitioner received 33 votes, rival 31, neither 2. In the run-off the petitioner
won 31 to 26. Petitioner thus received 5o% of the first vote, 54% of the second.
'No other run-offs are yet reported. Only in three instances before March 1 had the "neither" vote
exceeded the vote of any union. And. since "neither" won the suffrage of a majority of the voters, the
Board dismissed these cases. American-France Line, 4 N.L.R.B. No. 68 (1937); id., No. 75 (937);
Richardson Co., 5 id. No. 43 (1938).
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7. CONCLUSION
Looking over the representation work of the Board we get a picture of orderly
progress in establishing a new system of employment control. Though collective
bargaining has become customary in many advanced industrial countries, positive
statutory support for it has a rather short history. 84 The United States now gives
it the support of a statute and a special agency to see to the application of the
statute.18 5 Essential to the success of this way of industrial life is a democratic means
of expressing the desires of the workers and making them effective factors in the
fixing of conditions of employment. In a country dedicated to upholding political
democracy, when other countries are forswearing it, it is meet that this form of
government should be extended from the political to the economic field. With the
helping hand of the national and state labor relations boards we are undergoing a
new birth of labor strength and labor responsibility, which may lead to a larger and
more vital participation of all men in the building of the world of tomorrow. With
machinery for the expression of popular opinion set up in every workplace in the
land, not only does the condition of the workers become a greater concern of all
who share in controlling mass production and mass distribution, but the workers
themselves from the time they leave school (and, one may hope, even before, through
similar responsibilities in school government) by their experience of participating in
the solution of group problems are preparing themselves for the performance of the
broader and more baffling responsibilities of citizenship itself.'8 6
It is therefore of high civic importance that the representation provisions of the
National Labor Relations Act be carried out with fairness, vigor, and wisdom. In
thus carrying them out the National Labor Relations Board is doing one of the most
significant jobs that government can do within the boundaries of the United States.
'41'FREEDOM. OF ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, STUDIES AND REPORTS, Series A,
No. 28-32 (1927-30); COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, id. No. 39 (1936); Thomas, European Legislation lor
Industrial Peace (1937) 16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 91. A few countries have gone farther than the United States
in legal furtherance of collective agreements. COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS, supra, at p. 78-92. And in
extending them to non-contracting persons. Id. at p. 186-9.
" Some countries that have set up special agencies to protect labor have created labor courts to assure
workers that their individual rights, statutory or contractual, are respected. But here statutory rights of
labor have been enforced either by the regular courts or by administrative agencies (labor commissions, in-
dustial accident boards, etc.), each with a narrow authority exercized subject to limited review by the
regular courts; whereas for the enforcement of (collective or individual) contractual rights a private
tribunal is sometimes created by collective agreement, but more often the agreement provides, in the event
of controversy, for settlement by ad hoc arbitrators or leaves enforcement entirely to the courts. Based on
statute, however, is "the National Railroad Adjustment Board, a unique administrative agency," as Lloyd
K. Garrison, first chairman of the first NLRB, describes it in the title of a recent article, (1937) 46
YALE L. J. 567. See also Byrer, The Railway Labor Act and the National Labor Relationf Act-A Corn.
parison (1937) 44 W. VA. L. Q., I, 6-io, (an article unfairly condemnatory of the NLRB). But the
NLRB has not the function of enforcing Contracts. (Breach is not an unfair labor practice.) It has the
function of freeing the formation and administration of workers' organizations from employer influence
and of facilitating their dealing with the employer.
"Speaking of the simultaneous development of labor unionism, John Herman Randall, Jr., says in
a witty article "on the importance of being unprincipled" (1938) 7 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 131, 142: "The
spread of labor organization, especially along industrial lines, in which countless locals and boards really
face the problems of their industry as a whole, cannot but be a factor in generating further political
intelligence. Only with such political-mindedness can America hope to escape thp devastating effects of
the essentially unpolitical [i.e., overprincipled] class-struggle that has afflicted Europe."
